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IGNORE THE RUMORS-CAMPAIGNING FROM THE
PULPIT IS OKAY: THINKING PAST THE
SYMBOLISM OF SECTION 501(c)(3)
MICHAEL HATFIELD*
Because of the unique treatment churches receive under
the Internal Revenue Code, the impact of the revocation is
likely to be more symbolic than substantial.
-The D.C. Court of Appeals.'
INTRODUCTION
This Article is enough to ruin many Thanksgiving family din-
ners. It is about American religion, politics, and taxes. Mostly it
is about taxes. As I will explain, this is what sets it apart from the
contemporary legal scholarship exploring the campaign restric-
tions on tax exempt churches.2 This Introduction identifies the
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professors Bryan Camp, Vaughn James, and Marilyn
Phelan of Texas Tech University School of Law and Darin N. Digby, Esq., Share-
holder, Schoenbaum, Curphy & Scanlan, P.C., for their thoughts and sugges-
tions. He also would like to thank ProfessorJill S. Manny, Executive Director of
the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New York University School
of Law, for her invaluable guidance throughout the years. All errors, however,
are claimed as his own.
1. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(upholding the only reported revocation of a church's tax exemption for
campaigning). Although the Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), case did not involve a church (but rather a relig-
ious broadcasting and publishing company), it is sometimes cited as a
campaigning church case. See, e.g., Amy R. Murphy, Revisiting Restrictions on Poli-
ticking from the Pulpit, TAX'N EXEMPTS, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 230.
2. This Article uses the term "church" and "churches" to mean bona fide
religious congregations, regardless of the particular religion of the congrega-
tion's participants. This follows the usage in the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (2003) and also in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Tax Code"). For purposes
of this Article, in any discussion of a church, I assume the church is self-gov-
erned and independent of any other organization(s) in terms of legal exis-
tence, governance, and tax status. How particular churches are governed will
be determined by denominational structures, which are variable. This makes
generalizations difficult and legally uncertain, as has been highlighted in the
recent disputes between local congregations and their denominational hierar-
chy. See, e.g., Elizabeth Austin, Exodus, Numbers, Judges, LEGAL AvF.,June 2004, at
65; Neela Banjeree, American Ruptures Shaking the Episcopal Church, N.Y. TIMES,
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problem addressed in the article, then introduces the contempo-
rary legal scholarship and the alternative approach this article
takes.
A. Ignore the Rumors: Campaigning from the Pulpit is Okay
There is no law that prohibits churches from campaigning.3
There is no law that prohibits pulpit endorsements or full page
newspaper ads for the political candidate of a church's choice.
Doing such would cost a Tax Exempt church its exemption
under Section 501 (c) (3). 4 But that is all. However, both the
popular5 and scholarly accounts6 of the Tax Code's campaign
restriction assume tax exemption for churches is "essential to
their ability to accomplish their religious and ethical obliga-
tions."7 But it is not.
Oct. 3, 2004, at 29; Greg Mellen, Ruling Goes Well For Breakaway Parish, LONG
BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Sept. 17, 2005, at A4; Gary Stern, Church Seeks to End its
Presbyterian Ties, J. NEWS, Sept. 18, 2004, at IA.
3. Campaign activity is itself extensively regulated. For example, corpora-
tions are forbidden to contribute to campaigns under the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (2000). However, the regulation of campaign-
ing is not the topic of this Article except insofar as that "regulation" is a result
of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (2000). Unless otherwise noted, "campaigning" is used to
mean activities such as endorsements of particular candidates from the pulpit
and publicizing such endorsements and not financial contributions to, or coor-
dination with, actual campaigns. Throughout this Article, words such as "cam-
paign for" and "campaigning" and like terms are meant in a general, non-
technical sense to mean any activity intended to help or hinder a particular
candidate from being elected, other than activities otherwise proscribed by law.
There is no implication that such help or hindrance is part of, or connected
with, a candidate's "campaign."
4. Unless otherwise noted, all references herein to a "Section" are to sec-
tions of the Tax Code, including the relevant Treasury Department Regulations
("Treasury Regulations") promulgated under that Section.
5. In addition to being covered on television broadcasts such as "The
O'Reilly Factor," e.g., The O'Reilly Factor: Personal Story: Preachers and Politicians
(Fox News broadcast Aug. 9, 2000), the issue is discussed in multiple newspaper
articles. See, e.g., Alexendra Alter & Andrea Robinson, Politics in the Pulpit Blurs
Lines Between Church, State, MLiM HERALD, Oct. 22, 2004, at IA; Connie Anast,
Op-Ed., Church Breaches Tax Law, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 27, 2004, at A12; Bill
Broadway, Political Limits Given To Churches, PRESS OF ATL. CIrY, Oct. 10, 2004, at
A8; Marni Pyke, Churches Tread Carefully In Election Process, CHI. DAILY HERALD,
Oct. 31, 2004, at 1; Jay Sekulow, The IRS Should Collect Taxes, Not Be The "Speech
Police", SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Sept. 1, 2004, at B5; Murray Whyte, Philadel-
phia Reverend's Pitch For John Kerry From The Pulpit Not Too Subtle, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 1, 2004, at A17.
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. Wyatt McDowell, How Religious Organizations and Churches Can Be Politi-
cally Correct, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 71, 77 (2003).
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None of the contemporary scholars calculate the value of tax
exemption to a church under Section 501 (c) (3). None of the
articles methodically explore the consequences to a church of
losing its tax exemption for campaigning. There is no step-by-
step analysis of potential tax liability. Instead, there is an assump-
tion that a church doing without tax exemption is "fundamen-
tally repugnant,"' so there is no need for substantive analysis of
the tax issues involved if a church becomes taxable. Instead of
analyzing the tax problem, the tax problem tends to be used to
introduce "bigger" ideas about the Constitution, religion, and
politics.9 In the current scholarship, the context of the issue-
religion and politics-tends to become substituted for the sub-
stance: federal income taxation. The critical issue, however, is
federal income taxation.
B. Asset Management Analysis of Tax Exemption for Churches
Even though the campaign restriction has been in Section
501 (c) (3) since 1954, the IRS has only revoked one church's tax
exemption for campaigning. I suspect this is because the IRS
knows that a taxable church is unlikely to generate any tax reve-
nue-so, from the IRS's perspective, why bother?1" The Church
at Pierce Creek is the church whose exemption was revoked, and
it argued that the tax liability it would suffer as a result of its
campaigning was an impermissible burden on its political-relig-
ious expression. The appeals court, however, found there was no
impermissible burden, concluding "the impact of the revocation
is likely to be more symbolic than substantial."11
The "Asset Management Analysis" of tax exemption that I
propose is setting out to determine if tax exemption for churches
is more symbolic than substantial. The analysis is to determine
the financial value of tax exemption for a church. The sugges-
tion is that a church interested in politics ought to weigh the
costs and benefits of tax exemption, and if convicted of its moral
8. See infra Part II.
9. For a discussion of preference in legal scholarship for "bigger" ideas,
see, for example, Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV.
917, 917 (1986); David M. Zlotnick, The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 971 (2001).
10. At some point, disregard of the Tax Code undermines enforcement
of the Tax Code generally, and thus the IRS must police the most egregious
campaigning, even if it is revenue neutral. Since the IRS has revoked only one
church's tax exemption for campaigning, it is reasonable to infer that the IRS is
only interested in the most egregious abuses.
11. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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duty to campaign, then it should forego tax exemption merely as
a cost of campaigning.
Though admittedly counter-intuitive, I believe that federal
income tax exemption is not necessarily worth much to many
churches. Many-if not most-churches would not have any
income tax liability even if they were taxable corporations.
Under Section 102, donations are not taxed as income. Eighty-
four percent of annual revenues for churches consist of dona-
tions, so eighty-four percent of annual revenue would not be sub-
ject to tax.12 The remaining sixteen percent would be covered by
deductions for operating expenses-salaries, building expenses,
and the like-which, in churches, tend to match or exceed
annual revenues, since churches tend to spend almost all of their
revenue each year. Many, if not most, churches would operate at
a tax loss each year, like many other "taxable" corporations.
The derivative benefits of federal income tax exemption
may not be worth much to churches either. While donors to
campaigning taxable churches cannot deduct their donations, it
is unlikely that more than thirty percent of church donors claim
the deduction in the first place. And while there is intuitive
appeal believing that the income tax deduction encourages char-
itable donation, the extent of such encouragement has never
been empirically established for donors generally, much less
religiously-motivated donors specifically. Furthermore, and most
importantly, if a church does become a taxable corporation in
order to campaign, it also becomes a potential recipient of addi-
tional donations-donations fueled by its members' political
motivation. So long as it is tax exempt, its members must direct
their politically-motivated contributions elsewhere.
There are state law benefits that churches receive, but, by
and large, these benefits are tied to their status as bona fide
churches, not to their status as federally tax-exempt organiza-
tions. This is also true of some non-tax federal benefits, such as
preferred postal rates. Taxable churches involved in campaigns
would not have to do without these benefits.
If, as I argue, federal income tax exemption turns out not to
be especially valuable for many churches, the implications are
legally and politically significant. Simply by amending their arti-
cles of incorporation, tax exempt churches can transform them-
selves into taxable churches and enable themselves to campaign
12. In contrast, most other types of tax-exempt organizations are prima-
rily funded by fees and other types of revenue that would generate an income
subject to tax. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NON-
PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2003).
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publicly and vociferously for the candidates of their choosing. If
there is a significant movement by bonafide churches outside the
Section 501 (c) (3) box, the government will need to address sev-
eral issues, since the institutionalized assumption of the IRS has
been that only "sham" churches ever fall outside the tax exemp-
tion box. Additionally, if tax exemption for churches is not
worth much, legal scholars should turn their attention towards
calculating the tax implications of churches being taxable, rather
than assuming away the tax issues in order to write articles about
the constitutional, historical, and religious implications of the
Section 501 (c) (3) campaign restriction. And, finally, the motiva-
tion for partisan tattling to the IRS on churches that campaign is
substantially undercut if, in fact, churches' financial well-being is
not dependent upon federal tax exemption.
C. Structure of Argument
Part I of this Article introduces the reader to the legal con-
text of "the problem" of churches being unable to campaign if
they choose to be Tax Exempt under Section 501 (c) (3). Part II
provides an overview of the current legal scholarship, which
assumes that tax exemption is essential to churches' financial
well-being, and hence has been labeled "Exemption Essential-
ism." Part III is a hypothetical tax-by-tax exploration of the claim
that Section 501 (c) (3) may not be essential to churches. Part IV
suggests some implications for churches, the government, legal
scholars, and partisans if, in fact, tax exemption is not so valuable
that it should deter churches from campaigning, if they are so
inclined. Finally, the Conclusion recaps the Article.
I. CuRRENT LAw: CHOOSING THE CAMPAIGN RESTRICTION By
CHOOSING TAX EXEMPTION
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with an
understanding of the current legal context of tax exemption for
churches under Section 501 (c) (3) and the consequent campaign
restrictions. Understanding the current legal context of Ameri-
can churches requires distinguishing between churches as non-
profit corporations and Section 501 (c) (3) organizations, as well
as understanding the benefits and restrictions of Section
501 (c) (3) that can be chosen by a church.
A. Churches as Non-Profit Corporations
For state law purposes, the contemporary trend is for
churches to organize by incorporating as a non-profit corpora-
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tion under their resident state law.' 3 Non-profit corporations are
not restrained in their ability to produce a "profit," but the profit
cannot be distributed 4-it must be used for corporate pur-
poses. 5 But, for the most part, a non-profit corporation has the
same powers and freedoms that a business corporation has. 6
Non-profit corporations are subject only to the types of
campaigning restrictions that business corporations are. 17 The
non-profit corporation statute does not impose a specific cam-
paign restriction on non-profit corporations.1 8
B. Federal Income Tax Exemption for Churches
Tax exemption is provided under Section 501, but the bene-
fits of tax exemption for churches and their donors are provided
in other sections of the Tax Code, as described below.
1. Exemption Under Section 501
Unless qualified for federal income tax exemption under
Section 501, non-profit corporations are taxable, subject to the
same corporate tax regime as any business corporation.1" Sec-
13. For the purposes of this Article, in addition to the definition
described in note two, references to a "church" will mean a statutory non-profit
corporation organized for congregational religious purposes. Since, by defini-
tion, churches organized as unincorporated associations do not file public orga-
nizational documents, it is impossible to determine how many American
congregations are unincorporated associations and how many are incorpo-
rated. The Chair of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws Drafting Committee to Amend the Unincorporated Non-Profit Associa-
tion Act, Professor Marilyn Phelan, has noted to me that the historical practice
of churches to remain unincorporated associations is changing out of concern
for limiting the liability of members and to ease the conduct of business. Of
course, there are variations among congregations based not only on histories of
unincorporated association, but also as a matter of denominational structure.
This usage is not intended to obscure the differences between churches organ-
ized as unincorporated associates and those incorporated, since the former may
incorporate at any time and the commonly accepted legal advice would be for
them to do so sooner, rather than later (e.g., to limit liability exposure),
denominational structures permitting.
14. See, e.g., Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
Art. 1396-1.01, §§ 2.01(A), 1.02(A) (3) (Vernon 1991).
15. See, e.g., id. at § 2.01 (A).
16. See, e.g., id. at § 2.02.
17. See, e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.091 (2005).
18. The freedom to campaign noted is the absence in state non-profit
corporation statutes of any general prohibition against campaigning. See discus-
sion supra note 3.
19. Corporations are subject to federal income tax under Subchapter C
of the Tax Code. Other than organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c), there
are only a handful of other ways to be exempted from the U.S. federal income
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tion 501 provides tax exemption for twenty-eight types of organi-
zations specified in Section 501(c). Of the twenty-eight types,
there are two under which a church might qualify for exemption:
Section 501 (c) (3) and Section 501 (c) (4). While it is possible for
churches to qualify for tax exemption under Section 501 (c) (4),
churches exempt under Section 501 (c) (4) are largely unknown
outside the imaginations of legal scholars (and still subject to
campaigning restrictions).2° It is Section 501 (c) (3) that is synon-
ymous with federal income tax exemption for churches.
Churches are exempted from federal income tax under Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) if they meet the following requirements:
" Being organized and operated exclusively for religious,
educational, or other charitable purposes;
* Not distributing any net earnings (i.e., profits) to individ-
uals (excepting, e.g., reasonable compensation of
employees);
* Not engaging in illegal activities or violating fundamen-
tal public policy;
* Not having any "substantial part" of its activity being
attempting to influence legislation (i.e., lobbying); and
" Not intervening in political campaigns.2 1
tax, none of which apply to churches: states and their political subdivisions are
exempt under I.R.C. § 115; foreign governments and certain of their instru-
mentalities are exempt under the terms of I.R.C. § 892; certain foreign persons
are exempted from tax on U.S. source income, either under provisions of the
Tax Code (e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (portfolio interest), and I.R.C.
§§ 871 (i) (2) (A), 881(d) (interest paid on U.S. bank accounts)) or by treaty;
and, generally, insurance companies are not taxed on that portion of their
receipts representing liabilities to depositors and policyholders pursuant to
I.R.C. § 807, for example. When the IRS revokes the Tax exemption of a Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) non-profit corporation, it continues its non-profit corporate
existence but becomes taxable in the same way as a business corporation. For
example, Bob Jones University is a South Carolina non-profit corporation but a
taxable corporation for federal tax purposes. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. Museum
& Gallery, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3120 (1996). Branch Ministries is
a New York not-for-profit corporation but a taxable corporation for federal tax
purposes. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
20. Professor Douglas H. Cook of Regent University School of Law sug-
gests organizing churches under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (4), but he cites no instances in
which churches have been so organized. For a complete discussion, see Doug-
las H. Cook, The Politically Active Church, 35 Loy'. U. CHI. L.J. 457 (2004). See also
infra text accompanying note 28.
21. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) states in pertinent part:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
20061
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While the first three requirements roughly correspond to
the restraints imposed on churches under state non-profit corpo-
ration law,22 the latter two requirements are unique to Section
501(c) (3). These restrictions are entirely independent of any
state law issues. Note that while churches are permitted "some"
(i.e., some amount short of a "substantial part") lobbying activities,
they are permitted no campaigning activities. 23 Since the prohibi-
tion against campaigning is in the statutory language of Section
501 (c) (3), a church that campaigns to any extent is not exempted.
Thus, a church organized as a non-profit corporation needs to
submit to the lobbying and campaign restrictions in its organiza-
tion and operation in order to be exempted from federal income
tax under Section 501 (c) (3).
So long as the church's articles of incorporation and its
actual operations fall within the Section 501 (c) (3) requirements,
it need do nothing else to be exempt from federal income tax
(i.e., there are no filing requirements).24 Unlike other types of
charities that might be described in Section 501 (c) (3), churches
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distrib-
uting of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in oppo-
sition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
22. Insofar as corporations are not sanctioned to engage in illegal activi-
ties, the third requirement's prohibition of illegal activities obviously corre-
sponds to state law statutory concepts for non-profit corporations. A more
interesting query is whether non-profit corporations may engage in activities
that violate the fundamental public policies of the states. This requirement of
operating consistently with such policies was taken from the common law of
charitable trusts and incorporated into the statutory requirements of I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983). However, to the extent that a state's non-profit corporation statute
fails to incorporate the common law of charitable trusts by reference or other-
wise, unless it explicitly includes such a requirement, non-profit corporations
may arguably not be required to operate consistently with their state's funda-
mental public policies perse, so long as their operations are not otherwise illegal
or afoul of the statute's explicit requirements.
23. For an overview of the meaning of "no substantial part" and the regu-
lation of lobbying under Section 501(c) (3), see Charles E. Hodges II & Edward
M. Manigault, Political Activity and Lobbying by Charities: How Far Can it Go? What
Are the Risks?, 93J. TAx'N 177 (2000).
24. Qualifying for I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) status requires meeting both the
"organizational" and "operational" tests set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1,
which requires that the organizational documents (e.g. articles of incorpora-
tion) fit within the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) description and that actual operations do
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are not required to submit an application to the IRS in order to
acquire recognition of tax exemption under Section 501 (c) (3).
2. Federal Tax Benefits of Section 501 (c) (3) Exemption
In addition to being exempted from income tax, fitting
within Section 501 (c) (3)'s restrictions on organization and oper-
ation confers several other federal tax benefits to churches. I will
explore some of these benefits in detail below, but generally the
federal tax benefits are as follows.
(a) Section 170 Deductibility of Donations. Unlike other non-
profit corporations (many of which are described in
other parts of Section 501(c), such as Section
501 (c) (4)), donors to Section 501 (c) (3) organizations
can deduct their donations for income, gift, and estate
tax purposes under other Tax Code Sections. 5
(b) Lessened Filing Requirements. Most Section 501 (c) (3)
organizations are required to file annual information
returns with the IRS.2 6 Churches are not.27
(c) Special Audit Protections. If the IRS decides to inspect
the Section 501 (c) (3) qualification of a church, it is
subjected to special rules for "church tax inquiries and
examinations."2" The examination must be limited to
determining if the church is, indeed, exempt under
Section 501 (c) (3) (or carrying on an unrelated trade
or business) and, if it is not exempt, to a determination
of tax liability.
29
(d) Employee-Related Benefits. There are unique tax treat-
ments related to employees of churches, including:
church employees are exempt from the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act and most state unemployment
laws;3 0
as well. Section 508(c) exempts churches from having to request that the IRS
recognize that they have met the organizational and operational tests.
25. I.R.C. § 7611 (2000). See also id. § 170 (income tax), § 2055 (estate
tax), § 2522 (gift tax).
26. Id. § 6033.
27. Id. § 6033(c) (2).
28. Id. § 7611.
29. Id. §§ 7611(b)(1)(a), 7611(b)(1)(B), 7611(h)(4)(A).
30. See id. §§ 3306(c) (8), 3309(b)(1); FiSHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 12,
at 101.
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church ministers are entitled to exclude rental
allowances paid as part of their compensation from
their income; 31 and qualified retirement plans for
churches are not subject to the same requirements as
qualified retirement plans for other organizations.32
(e) Miscellaneous Benefits. There are other tax and non-tax
benefits conditioned upon being exempt under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3). For example, churches exempt from
federal income tax under Section 501 (c) (3) are enti-
tled to various other potential benefits, such as the
ability to issue tax-exempt bonds3" and an exemption
from the federal wagering excise tax. 4  These and
other relatively obscure benefits are discussed in more
detail below.
3. Federal Tax Impact of Campaigning
The political campaigning prohibition for Section 501 (c) (3)
organizations is absolute. 5 Without the campaigning prohibi-
tion, tax deductible donations could be used for a purpose for
which no tax deduction is otherwise provided: political
campaigning.36 The policy against Section 501 (c) (3) organiza-
tions campaigning derives not from Section 501 (c) (3) but from
31. I.R.C. § 107 (2000).
32. See id. § 414.
33. See id. § 145 (a)(1); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 98-99.
34. See I.R.C. § 4421 (2) (b); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 12, at 103.
35. While there may be some common law antecedents to this restriction,
the statutory restriction in I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) was added to the Tax Code in
1954. The amendment was sponsored by then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. It
has been speculated (presumably rightfully) that his sponsorship was motivated
to overcome a challenger in the 1954 Democratic primary. The challenger was
receiving the support of a Section 501 (c) (3) organization, which effectively
held itself out as a permissible recipient of tax-deductible donations for his cam-
paign. Although no one can doubt that LBJ's campaign benefited by thwarting
a source of his opponent's tax-deducted financial support, the fact that his
opponent was receiving the benefit of tax-deductible donations is objectively
problematic. For a review of common law campaign prohibition issues, see
Debra Morris, Political Activity and Charitable Status at Common Law: In
Search of Certainty (1998), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/library/
publications/Confl998MorrisPaper.pdf (presented at Nat'l Ctr. on Philan-
thropy & the Law Conference on Political Activities: Nonprofit Speech). For a
good discussion of the 1954 amendment itself, see, e.g., Deirdre Dessingue, Pro-
hibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits; Mhy; to What End?, 42
B.C. L. REv. 903, 905 (2001); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A
Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42
B.C. L. REv. 733 (2001).
36. Campaign contributions are not deductible, and never have been.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B); Art. 143 Treas. Regs. 33 (Revised 1918); Rev.
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Section 170, which provides an income tax deduction for dona-
tions to Section 501 (c) (3) organizations. In order to keep
deducted donations from being indirectly used for political pur-
poses, Section 501(c) (3) organizations cannot be permitted to
campaign. Otherwise, political campaigns would be federally
subsidized, which would force Republican taxpayers to finan-
cially support Democratic campaigns and vice versa.38
A church that campaigns can lose its federal income tax
exemption under Section 501 (c) (3) as well as the other tax bene-
fits that derive from that exemption (e.g., deductibility of dona-
tions) and potentially be subjected to various taxes described in
Section 527 and Section 4955. Awareness of this bundle of con-
sequences is no doubt the source of the widely-held perception
that churches are "prohibited" from campaigning.
In anticipation of each presidential campaign period since
1992, the IRS has issued a warning to American churches to
abstain from political campaigning."9 The IRS reminds churches
that under Section 501 (c) (3) they may participate in certain
types of voter education related to the political campaigns, such
as hosting non-partisan, unbiased fora or distributing non-parti-
san, unbiased voting guides, but partisan campaigning (e.g.,
using the pulpit or church-related publications to encourage
votes for particular candidates) is absolutely forbidden.4 °
Despite the warnings and the potential consequences, some
churches do campaign. 41 There are no estimates of how many
churches campaign, or want to campaign, but since most Ameri-
cans are opposed to church involvement in campaigns, I assume
Rul. 71-449, 1971-2 C.B. 77 (superseding I.T. 3276, 1939-1 C.B. 108); Rev. Rul.
54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11.
37. See, e.g., Dessingue, supra note 35, at 918; see also Ann M. Murphy,
Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX
REV. 35 (2003).
38. Whether or not tax exemption and deductible donations should be
considered a federal subsidy for theoretical purposes, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that they are. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 544 (1983); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983).
But see, e.g., Dessingue, supra note 35.
39. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 1823,
TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (2003).
40. Id. at 8-11.
41. For an excellent and detailed review of the political activities of Amer-
ican churches, see Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have
American Churches Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax exemption?,
43 CATH. LAW. 29, 47-69 (2004). See also Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and
Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of
Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REv. 875, 885 (2001).
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that the majority of churches are relatively disinterested.4 2 Peri-
odic proposals to permit Section 501 (c) (3) churches to cam-
paign without negative federal tax consequences have failed to
generate sufficient support to become law.43
After the recent religiously and politically divisive American
presidential elections, there appears to have been a spike in the
number of churches reported to the IRS for campaigning.44
Americans United for Separation of Church and State is the
source of some of these reports, which are about evenly divided
between Republican and Democratic campaign-supporting
churches.45 Speculatively, the balance of the reports originate
from individuals or groups opposing the campaigns supported by
the various churches.46
4. Constitutional Impact of Restriction on Churches
Campaigning
Despite the constitutional sensitivity of religious and politi-
cal expression, in 1995 the IRS revoked the tax exemption of
The Church at Pierce Creek in Binghamton, New York 47 for an
excessively blatant involvement in the 1992 presidential cam-
paign.48 This is the only time that the IRS has revoked the fed-
42. About sixty-four percent of Americans oppose clergy expressing their
political views in pulpits. See Religion and Politics: The Ambivalent Majority, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Sept. 20, 2000, at 5. Among some
religious groups (e.g., Roman Catholics), the opposition is even stronger. See
Dessingue, supra note 35, at 927.
43. For a review of recent proposals, see Benjamin S. De Leon, Rendering
a Taxing New Tide on .R. C. § 501 (c)(3): The Constitutional Implications of H.R.
2357 and Alternatives for Increased Political Freedom in Houses of Worship, 23 REv.
LITIG. 691 (2004); David Menz, Charities, Churches, Campaigns & Candidates, ARK.
LAW., Summer 2004, at 8. The failure of these proposals to confer greater
campaigning freedom to churches must be due, in some part, to the fact that
the proposals have been opposed by the leaders of a wide spectrum of Christian
denominations-from Eastern Orthodox to Presbyterian, Baptist to Methodist.
See Murphy, supra note 37, at 80.
44. As of October 29, 2004, more than one-hundred tax-exempt organiza-
tions had been reported to the IRS for their political activities. For a good
introduction to the current state of tax-tattling affairs, see Murphy, supra note 1,
at 235.
45. Barry W. Lynn, Letter to the Editor, Keep Partisan Politics Out of the
Churches, CHI. SUN-TiMES, July 7, 2004, at 42.
46. See, e.g., Marni Pyke, Churches Tread Carefully In Election Process, CHI.
DAILY HERALD, Oct. 31, 2004, at 1; see also Rat Out A Church Home Page,
http://www.ratoutachurch.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
47. The New York not-for-profit corporation is Branch Ministries, Inc.
d/b/a "The Church at Pierce Creek." Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d
137, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
48. Id.
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eral tax exemption of a church for campaigning.49 As described
below, the revocation resulted in a series of law review articles
considering, for the most part, the public policy implications of
the revocation for religious and political expression.
The Church at Pierce Creek's violation of Section 501 (c) (3)
was not a close call for the IRS or the courts. The church pur-
chased full page advertisements in both USA Today and the Wash-
ington Times alerting "Christians Beware" of Bill Clinton because
of what the advertisements alleged to be his positions on abor-
tion, homosexuality, and condom distribution. 50 As if calculated
to provoke the IRS, the advertisements concluded with the
address of the church and a solicitation for "tax-deductible dona-
tions for this advertisement."'5' The ads produced hundreds of
donations to the church. 52 Articles in the New York Times assured
the church that the IRS would take notice of the ads, in the
rather unlikely event it missed them in both USA Today and the
Washington Times.53
The church had three lines of defense against the IRS. The
first defense was a technical tax argument. The second defense
was a religious freedom defense. The third defense was selective
prosecution.
As its technical tax defense, the church argued that
"churches" were not described in Section 501 (c) (3) (and thus
not subject to its campaign restrictions) but were nevertheless
exempt under Section 501 by virtue of a cross-reference in Sec-
tion 508. 5' The court noted the technical tracing of the word
"church" through Section 501 and Section 508 but found the
argument "more creative than persuasive. '55 Sufficiently damn-
ing, however, was that, though not required to do so, the church
had voluntarily applied to the IRS for recognition of its tax
exemption under Section 501(c) (3).56
Asserting its religious rights, the church argued that the
income tax liabilities and loss of deductions it would suffer as a
result of losing its Section 501 (c) (3) exemption constituted an
impermissible burden on its rights to religious and political
expression guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the
49. Murphy, supra note 1, at 232.
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993." The court was
unpersuaded, concluding that "the impact of the revocation is
likely to be more symbolic than substantial."58  The court
explained that the revocation would not "necessarily make the
Church liable for the payment of taxes" because, as "the IRS
explicitly represented in its brief and reiterated at oral argument,
the revocation of the exemption" would not convert donations
into income taxable to the church-such donations are excluded
from income under Section 102." 9 As for any decrease in dona-
tions, the court noted that the church could abstain from
campaigning and re-claim its tax exemption (and deductible
donations) at any time.6 ° The potential for decreased money for
the church, whether as a result of an incrementally larger tax
burden or lost deductions, did not amount to an unconstitu-
tional burden. Further, the court noted that the church had an
alternative means of expressing itself through a particular corpo-
rate structure of affiliated organizations, one of which would be
the church and two others of which could facilitate
campaigning. 61
The church also alleged that it had been targeted because of
a political bias at the IRS. It claimed it had its exemption
revoked because it opposed a Democratic candidate. The
church argued that the IRS routinely permits churches to sup-
port Democratic candidates and that it had been singled out for
its viewpoint.62 The court reasoned that since the church did not
allege that any of the campaigning by "Democratic churches"
involved placing campaign ads in national newspapers soliciting
tax deductible donations, that the church had not established
that it had been treated differently from similarly situated
churches.63
Unpersuaded by any of the church's arguments, the court
upheld the revocation. The church did not appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. And, best I can tell, no legal scholar has claimed
the appeals court got it wrong.
57. Id. at 142.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 143. The court's point is that I.R.C. § 102 excludes donations
from the income of (even) taxable U.S. taxpayers. See discussion infra Part
III.B.3.
60. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143.
61. Id."
62. Id. at 144.
63. Id. at 144-45. The idea that the IRS is more interested in policing
"Republican churches" rather than Democratic churches has also been made in
the popular press. See, e.g., Robert Novak, Civil War Looms for Republicans, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 28, 2004, at 39. But see Lynn, supra note 45, at 42.
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D. Taxable Churches
There are three ways that a church can fail to be exempted
under Section 501 (c) (3). The first requires a choice upon incor-
poration and thus will not be discussed in much detail in this
article (since it is an unavailable option for existing churches).
The second is when the IRS revokes the tax exemption of an
existing church, which was discussed above with respect to The
Church at Pierce Creek. The third, the primary focus of the
hypothetical analyzed below, is when a church decides to "con-
vert" from being a "Tax Exempt Church" to a "Taxable Church."
1. Option One: Become Taxable Upon Incorporation
When incorporating as a non-profit corporation, a church
has a choice as to whether or not its articles of incorporation
comply with the Section 501 (c) (3).64 If a church chooses not to
fit itself within Section 501 (c) (3), it will be taxable for federal
income tax purposes. Such a Taxable Church also will not be
entitled to some of the benefits described above. This choice-
upon-incorporation is the first way a church can be exempt.
2. Option Two: Become Taxable Upon Revocation of
Exemption
The second way in which a church can become a Taxable
Church is, of course, through the revocation of its tax exemption
by the IRS. The Church at Pierce Creek had the duly-worded
articles of incorporation, but its participation in the 1992 presi-
dential campaign pushed it outside the Section 501 (c) (3) box.
The IRS revoked its exemption, and the church became a taxa-
ble non-profit corporation.
3. Option Three: Amending Articles of Incorporation
If a church begins its corporate life within the Section
501 (c) (3) box, it can change its mind. This is the third way a
church can become a Taxable Church. For example, a Tax
Exempt Church will become a Taxable Church if it amends its
articles of incorporation to authorize itself to engage in
campaigning.6 5 Since amendments to articles of incorporation
are typically given a prospective effective date, this provides a
good means for a Tax Exempt Church to convert to a Taxable
64. Churches that are currently merely unincorporated associations
could avail themselves of this option by incorporating with articles that permit
campaigning.
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (3) (ii) (as amended in 1990).
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Church on a specified date (e.g., January 1 of an upcoming
year). The hypothetical section of this article focuses on this type
of conversion, comparing and contrasting the benefits of a par-
ticular church before and after its conversion from a Tax Exempt
Church to a Taxable Church.
II. THE CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP: EXEMPTION ESSENTIALISM AND
IGNORING TAXABLE CHURCHES
The current scholarship contrasts with this article primarily
in that the current scholarship fails to consider Taxable
Churches as a viable alternative to Tax Exempt Churches, even
though the court in the Branch Ministries case thought the distinc-
tion between the two types of churches was largely symbolic.
This section introduces the reader to the current legal scholar-
ship on campaigning churches and tax exemption.
A. Post-Branch Ministries Scholarship: Exemption Essentialism
The Branch Ministries case produced a stream of published
legal scholarship exploring the consequences and implications of
the Section 501 (c) (3) campaign prohibition on churches.66 This
scholarship is the first scholarship on the campaigning church to
begin with three facts: the IRS will revoke the tax exemption of a
Tax Exempt Church that campaigns; the revocation will be upheld;
and there will not be a material consensus among lawyers or schol-
ars that either is the wrong result.67 None of the current scholars
have sought to undermine the court's conclusions, even though
some of the literature has explored the civic wisdom in
restraining churches from campaign involvement.
On the one hand, there is good variety in the post-Branch
Ministries articles. As described in more detail below, the articles
tend to be quite different from each other in terms of perspec-
tives, tones, and suggestions. They are inconsistent in their con-
66. There are eight articles published after the Branch Ministries case that
both address the case and focus on campaigning churches as a central topic of
analysis. These articles comprise the "Exemption Essentialist" analysis: Cook,
supra note 20; Dessingue, supra note 35; Alan L. Feld, Rendering Unto Caesar or
Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax exemption for Participation in Electoral
Politics, 42 B.C. L. REv. 931 (2001); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith: Taxes,
Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771 (2001); James, supra
note 41; Johnson, supra note 41; McDowell, supra note 7; Murphy, supra note
37.
67. Indeed, I am unaware of a single lawyer (other than the church's
own) or legal scholar who has published an opinion that either the IRS or the
court was wrong in how it handled the campaigning by The Church at Pierce
Creek.
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clusions: some "for" the Section 501 (c) (3) restrictions, some
"against," and some with technical suggestions.
My criticism of the current state of the scholarship is on the
other hand: all scholars assume that federal income tax exemp-
tion is essential to churches. None of the scholars attempt to
determine the financial value of Section 501 (c) (3) status. None
of the articles methodically explore the consequences to a
church of losing its tax exemption for campaigning. There is no
step-by-step analysis of potential tax liability. Based upon such an
analysis, I conclude below that tax exemption for churches that
want to campaign may not be so valuable that it should deter
them from campaigning. Unfortunately, in many ways, I have no
one to argue with. Perhaps I am wrong and tax exemption for
churches is substantially more valuable than I conclude, but
nowhere in the legal scholarship has anyone attempted to deter-
mine the value. Failing to measure the costs, I believe, is not only
a peculiar way to analyze a tax issue but a methodologically
indefensible one.
Even though the only campaign restriction for churches is
found in I.R.C. Section 501 (c) (3), the current legal scholarship
does not conceive the fundamental issue as a tax choice for
churches between campaigning and Section 501 (c) (3) status.
Their conceptual mistake, I believe, is assuming churches neces-
sarily to be a subset of Section 501 (c) (3) organizations.6" I have
used the terms "Taxable Church" and "Tax Exempt Church" to
make it clear that churches need not be Section 501 (c) (3) orga-
nizations. The shared premise of the contemporary scholarship
is that Section 501 (c) (3) tax status is essential to churches, which
is why I have labeled the current scholarship "Exemption
Essentialism."
B. Emphasizing the Non-Tax Issues for Campaigning Churches
Rather than focusing on the fact that the Section 501 (c) (3)
campaign restriction is part of the Tax Code, most of the current
literature has one of three focuses: history, balancing the church-
state relationship; and governmental hostility to the religion.
The shared, and I believe mistaken assumption, between the
varied approaches is assuming tax exemption is essential to
churches' financial well-being.
68. See., e.g., McDowell, supra note 7, at 101; Murphy, supra note 37, at 2.
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1. History
Some of the current scholarship emphasizes the historical
nature of tax exemption for churches. One professor reviews
"the historical development of the religious tax exemption, trac-
ing the progress of the exemption through Judeo-Christian his-
tory to post-revolutionary America.""9  Another begins her
history in 2800 B.C.E.7 ° As interesting as the articles are, the his-
tory of tax exemption for churches is not (and cannot be) used
to frame or resolve the contemporary tax issues for campaigning
churches.
2. Balancing the Church-State Relationship
Some of the Exemption Essentialists focus on balancing the
church-state relationship, exploring the "spheres of religion and
electoral politics"'" or the way in which "religion and politics
enjoy an uneasy relationship in the law."7 2 Some of the Exemp-
tion Essentialists argue for strict separation between church and
state.7 3 Others dismiss a necessarily strict separation speaking,
instead, in terms of a balancing act of interests, with some con-
cluding that, on the balance, churches should be kept from
campaigning," while others conclude church involvement will
"strengthen our democracy."75 However, all the talk about "state
regulation" and "spheres" and the "uneasy relationship" is not
really about churches and politics-but about Tax Exempt
Churches and politics. The relationship between Taxable
Churches and the state, regulation, and politics is never
explored.
3. Governmental Hostility to Religion
The most emotionally charged rhetoric in the Exemption
Essentialist literature is that conditioning tax exemption for
churches on abstinence from political campaigns is a hostile gov-
ernment act. Allegedly, it is "simply the government's way of pay-
ing churches not to talk about certain things,"76 that is, "buying
the churches' silence."7 7 We are told that this is part of the
69. James, supra note 41, at 31.
70. Murphy, supra note 37, at 41.
71. Feld, supra note 66, at 939.
72. Johnson, supra note 41, at 877.
73. SeeJames, supra note 41, at 78.
74. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 37.
75. Johnson, supra note 41, at 884.
76. Garnett, supra note 66, at 779.
77. Id. at 778.
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state's attempt to "move religion into the realm of subjective
preference by eliminating religious consciousness"7 " or at least to
"tame religion by saying what it is and identifying what it is
not ... and convince religious consciousness to internalize the
state's own judgment that faith does not belong in politics."79
This, we are told, is how "government molds religion's own sense
of what it is."' The purported result "is a privatized faith, re-
shaped to suit the vision and needs of government, and a public
square evacuated of religious associations capable of mediating
between persons and the state and challenging prophetically the
government's claims and conduct."'" The argument is that Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) is so powerful and pernicious that American
"religious consciousness" is "unable to resist the conclusion that
its claims to public truth are 'implausible nonsense.', 2 Even if
restricting churches from campaigning is pernicious and out-
rightly hostile to religion, the question of avoiding this danger
and blunting this hostility by foregoing Section 501 (c) (3) status
is never addressed.
C. Current Scholarship on the Tax Issues
It would be unfair to claim that none of the current scholars
understand that churches have a choice between campaign
restrictions and taxability. Some of the Exemption Essentialists
do acknowledge churches to have a choice. But the claim is that
"the reality of their choice" is "fundamentally repugnant"8 3 or
that churches' federal tax exemption is "essential to their ability
to accomplish their religious and ethical obligations."84 But
there are no footnotes for these claims. There is no analysis
showing that federal tax exemption is "essential" to a church
accomplishing its "religious and ethical obligations" or why los-
ing federal tax exemption would be "fundamentally repugnant."
Even when the theoretical possibility of a church being a Taxable
Church is acknowledged, it is not explored.
78. Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmathomachy: A "Privatization" Theory of the Relig-
ion Clause Cases, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 275, 277 (1986) (cited in Garnett, supra note
66, at 774).
79. Garnett, supra note 66, at 776-77.
80. Id. at 796.
81. Id. at 771.
82. Bradley, supra note 78, at 280 (quoted in Garnett, supra note 66, at
797).
83. Dessingue, supra note 35, at 920.
84. McDowell, supra note 7, at 77.
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1. Assuming the Relative Value of Tax Exemption
The assumption made-and the assumption I am calling
into question-is that Tax Exempt status is essential to the finan-
cial health of each church. Unlike Exemption Essentialists, I do
not believe in "attributing churches' wealth to their tax-exempt
status."85 That would be like attributing the wealth of a pension
plan to its tax exempt status, ignoring that no matter the benefit
gained from the exemption, the primary source of the wealth
comes from the employees' and employers' contributions and
picking the right investments. However, churches' wealth is not
derived from tax exemption or even good stock picks. Unlike
any other institution (even most charitable institutions),
churches are funded by the year-in, year-out apparently inex-
haustible generosity of their members.8 6 This makes a differ-
ence, as I will argue below.
Even though Exemption Essentialists make preserving Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) status into one of churches' primary objectives,
the tax issues of churches receive little detailed attention. Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) is described by one of the scholars as "the tip of a
monstrous iceberg of tax law that affects churches." 7 Neverthe-
less, the iceberg is of little interest to him. His article has no tax
analysis. He offers no suggestions on how churches might navi-
gate past this "iceberg" to warmer waters-waters free of Section
501(c) (3) status.
The benefits of tax exemption to Tax Exempt Churches are
described as having the "same net economic effect as a direct
payment from the government."88 None of the Exemption
Essentialists set out to determine the value of such a "direct pay-
ment." Some of the scholars do list indirect benefits of federal
tax exemption, such as qualifying for tax-exempt bond financing
and possible exemptions under labor, bankruptcy and other
laws, but without investigating how many churches benefit from
tax-exempt bonds or bankruptcy exemptions.8 " Some of the
listed benefits, such as preferred postal rates and many state tax
exemptions (as discussed below in more detail) actually result
not from federal tax exemption per se but from merely being
organized as a church or a non-profit. °° The mistake in catalog-
85. James, supra note 41, at 42.
86. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
87. Garnett, supra note 66, at 772 n.6.
88. Feld, supra note 66, at 937.
89. See, e.g., id. at 936; James, supra note 41, at 42-43.
90. See infra Part III.B.7.
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ing benefits is easy enough to make, especially when the distinc-
tion is lost between "non-profit," "church," and "Tax Exempt."
None of the scholars gives thought to how a church might
determine the value of its tax exemption, the value of its "direct
payment." They assume the value is obvious and obviously high.
One of the authors notes in passing that the benefits "will vary
greatly with the entity" and are more likely to result from the
deductibility of donations to the church than the exemption
from income tax per se.91 About a half-dozen sentences are used
to frame and resolve the issue, while the remainder of his article
ignores it. Indeed, he enjoins churches to "go and sin no
more"92 with political campaigning rather than considering if
they might campaign without sin or, more importantly for this
discussion, tax liability.
2. Specific Tax Issues Addressed by Exemption Essentialists
I do not want to suggest that there is no substantive consid-
eration of tax issues in this literature. Some of the articles take
the tax issues seriously. Some of their considerations are wrong,
such as concluding that charitable donations would be subject to
corporate income tax if a church were not Tax Exempt.93 Or
wrong-headed, such as asserting that a church that campaigns
would be subjected to an onerous penalty tax, without clarifying
that the tax would only apply to a Tax Exempt Church that cam-
paigned.94 However, other Exemption Essentialists offer reason-
able suggestions for increased guidance to churches on the
restrictions or changes in the campaign restrictions.95
One of the tax themes in the literature is to suggest alterna-
tive but complex corporate structures that would permit political
engagement by an organization other than the church but none-
theless associated with the church.96 These corporate structures
91. Feld, supra note 66, at 936.
92. Id. at 936.
93. McDowell, supra note 7, at 101; see infra Part III.B.3.
94. McDowell, supra note 7, at 75; see infra Part III.B.2.
95. Johnson, supra note 41, at 900-01; Feld, supra note 66, at 939.
96. Professor Douglas H. Cook (Regent University School of Law) sug-
gests a structure involving both a Section 501(c) (4) corporation and a Section
501(c) (3) corporation to permit a church to both campaign and receive tax-
deductible donations. Cook, supra note 20, at 473. However, Professor Alan L.
Feld (Boston University School of Law) claims that a Section 501(c) (4) corpo-
ration cannot campaign (though it can lobby), and so a church needs not only
a more complex structure involving a Section 501(c) (3) corporation and a
501 (c) (4) corporation but also a 527 corporation. Feld, supra note 66, at
935-36. What Professor Feld suggests is sometimes called a "triad," and is also
suggested by, e.g., Professor Ann M. Murphy (Gonzaga University School of
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are commonly suggested in the practice-oriented legal litera-
ture,97 as well as by the courts.98 Though technically feasible, I
believe these structures are unsuited for churches since the
church's pastor still would not be able to endorse a candidate
from the pulpit, which I assume is the kind of freedom of politi-
cal speech most churches are interested in if they want to cam-
paign. Churches interested in campaigning would lose a
considerable amount of their moral authority in a campaign if
they were to hide themselves in the sort of corporate-subsidiary
structure that tax lawyers love to dream up-and that seem more
appropriate for international tax-haven venture capital funds
than "prophetic voices" crying in the wilderness.
3. The IRS and Exemption Essentialists
The Exemption Essentialists share an assumption as to the
value of tax exemption and the deterrence value of the threat of
its loss, but they do not share the same perspective on the IRS.
Some write that the IRS "has exercised great restraint in its
enforcement,"99 appropriately "reflect[ing] the sensitive nature
of the First Amendment values present,""1 ' or that "undoubt-
edly" because of the "importance of free speech and the freedom
of religion in this country, [IRS] audit activity in this area has
been close to non-existent."' '
While one of the scholars concerned with religious issues
pleas for stricter enforcement by the IRS,1 °2 another concerned
with religious issues thinks that it would be "tragic if the IRS
enforcement chilled the necessary prophetic contribution of
religious communities. ' 0' This latter author does not argue that
Congress should change the statutory prohibition against
campaigning, instead arguing that it is the IRS that "continues to
limit churches," which he is afraid diminishes the "priestly and
prophetic roles" of the church. With an apparent Cold War allu-
sion, he expresses the depth of his concern about the IRS enforcing
the campaign prohibition: "The church's capacity to witness,
Law). Murphy, supra note 37, at 82. The simpler structure suggested by Profes-
sor Cook is apparently not considered adequate by Professors Feld and Murphy,
or otherwise the triad would not be necessary.
97. See, e.g., FRANCES R. HILL & DouGLAs M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS para. 6.08 (2005).
98. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143-44 (D.C. Cir
2000).
99. Feld, supra note 66, at 934.
100. Id. at 931.
101. Murphy, supra note 37, at 68.
102. James, supra note 41, at 78.
103. McDowell, supra note 7, at 103.
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whether in Russia or the United States, depends largely on its
freedom from governmental suppression, intrusion, and
seduction." 04
Some of the Exemption Essentialists characterize an IRS of
restraint out of sensitivity to Constitutional freedoms, while
others worry about its lack of enforcement and still others worry
about the powers of "suppression, intrusion and seduction" the
IRS holds. None of them ponder if IRS enforcement behavior
on this issue can be accounted for exclusively in terms of how
little-to-no additional revenue would be collected from a church,
even if it were "taxable." While I have no way to prove it, I sus-
pect that the IRS has yet to collect in sufficient revenue from the
Church at Pierce Creek to offset its costs in litigating the case.
Nevertheless, in the fifteen years since the Church at Pierce
Creek purchases the campaign ads, the IRS has never again
taken on the expense of revoking a church's tax exemption for
campaigning.
D. Ignoring the Court: The Failure of Exemption Essentialism
In much of the contemporary scholarship, the context of
the issue-religion and politics 05 -has been substituted for the
substance: federal income taxation. I suspect an article about
religion and politics is more fun to write,"0 6 and I fear a good bit
more fun to read too. Nevertheless, the substantive legal issues
are tax issues.
The tax issues are often used by the Exemption Essentialist
scholars merely to illustrate their jurisprudential or religious con-
victions. The articles seem more a means to display those convic-
tions rather than to analyze the tax problem. Instead of
analyzing the tax problem, the tax problem tends to be used as a
literary device to introduce the scholars' "bigger picture" ideas
about religion and politics. The weakness of the articles is not
104. Id. at 72.
105. For a discussion of preference in legal scholarship for such "big
ideas" such as these, see, e.g., Farber, supra note 9, and Zlotnick, supra note 9.
106. Whether or not legal scholars are writing just for fun-or why it is we
are writing at all-is an issue explored in the Fall 2004 issue of the San Diego
Law Revieu.
Are we seeking to improve the law by bringing moral, economic, and
psychological wisdom to bear in a way that will enlighten judges and
practitioners? Do we hope to change the rules and conditions of soci-
ety, through the medium of law? Are we fulfilling professional duty in
the best way we know how, with no particular plan in mind? Are we
just having fun?
Emily Sherwin, Why We Write: Reflections on Legal Scholarship, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1739, 1739-40 (2004). It may just be I have more fun writing about taxes.
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necessarily in their grander ideas. The weakness is in interpret-
ing the Tax Code symbolically rather than economically. A tax
without a cost has no meaning. Somehow, the Branch Ministries
court's observation has been lost in the scholarly "analysis" of the
campaigning church problem: "Because of the unique treatment
churches receive under the Internal Revenue Code, the impact
of the revocation is likely to be more symbolic than substan-
tial."1°7 The Exemption Essentialist scholars have published a
great deal about the symbolism of revocation, but seem mostly
unconcerned with the substance of revocation-that substance
being the taxation of Taxable Churches.
III. ASSET MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS OF TAx EXEMPTION: WHAT
DOES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION COST?
Applying the Asset Management Analysis to the Tax Exempt
Church is the only way to determine what the cost of political
campaigning to a church is, since a church can campaign if it is
willing to become a Taxable Church.
A. Introducing Asset Management Analysis
Asset Management Analysis of the tax exemption of
churches is determining the financial value of being a Tax
Exempt Church. Tax exemption should be considered a finan-
cial asset manageable under the same principles as any other
church asset.1 ° 8 For churches that want to campaign, tax exemp-
tion comes with a cost-the prohibition on campaigning. The
suggestion is that a church interested in politics ought to weigh
the costs and benefits of being a Tax Exempt Church.
Speaking of the costs and benefits of tax exemption permits
a shift to thinking of Section 501 (c) (3) tax exemption as an asset
of this or that particular church, rather than part of the essence
107. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
108. As directors of non-profit corporations, those who direct church bus-
iness have a duty of care and a duty of loyalty, which means they must make
informed and reasonable business decisions that promote the non-profit's pur-
poses. I urge church directors to take their fiduciary duties seriously and
inform themselves of the costs and benefits of tax exemption to their particular
church and the costs and benefits of political campaigning to their particular
church's mission and then to make a decision, rather than assuming that tax
exemption and its consequent restrictions is simply part of being a church.
Legal scholars may not violate any fiduciary duties when they assume the value
of assets. But church directors do. They cannot guess at the value of their
portfolio. Nor should they guess at the value of their tax exemption. For an
introduction to the duties of non-profit directors, see, e.g., Harvey J.
Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradox,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23J. CORP. L. 631 (1998).
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of churches. Asset Management Analysis begins not with the tax
essence of churches but rather with the fact that individual
churches exist, and we must decide how they are to be taxed,
regardless of how the ancient Egyptians' 9 or even the British11 °
taxed religion, regardless of what Chief Justice John Marshall. 1
might have to say, and regardless of whether LBJ intended to
prohibit churches from campaigning or only intended to be re-
elected when he proposed the campaign restriction be added to
Section 501 (c) (3).112
The individual church need not make a decision for all
other churches; it need only choose for itself. And the decision
of every church is whether to acquire, maintain, or divest itself of
Section 501 (c) (3) exemption. It should be seen as a financial
decision because it is a tax decision.
If a church is convicted of its moral duty to campaign, then
it should consider the foregoing of the value of tax exemption as
merely a cost of campaigning, no different in quality than any of
the other costs of campaigning-bumper stickers, car window fly-
ers, and pancake breakfasts. As I will argue below, counter-intui-
tive though it is, the financial value of being a Tax Exempt
Church may not be much to many churches.
B. Applying Asset Management Analysis: A Case Study
Asset Management Analysis cannot be done categorically.
The value of the tax exemption subsidy for one church may not
be the same as for another. This is an issue for churches to
decide on a case-by-case basis in light of their own situations.
Thus, we need a hypothetical case: First United Church of Roch-
ester, Texas. First United Church fits within the typical profile of
a medium-sized religious congregation anywhere in America.11
First United Church has three hundred members.' 14 Chari-
table donations are First United Church's primary source of reve-
109. James, supra note 41, at 32.
110. Murphy, supra note 37, at 41-42.
111. Garnett, supra note 66, at 777.
112. Dessingue, supra note 35, at 905.
113. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS:
MEASURING THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 3 (2000), available at http://
www.independentsector.org/programs/research/ReligiousCong.pdf (describ-
ing congregation characteristics based on size). I have chosen to make First
United Church fit the profile of a medium congregation as that term is used in
this report. However, the choice between small, medium, and large congrega-
tions, as those terms are used in the report, should not make any difference in
the analysis or conclusions.
114. Id.
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nue: eighty-four percent of its annual revenue comes from
donations.1 5 The other sixteen percent of its revenue comes
from tuition payments, interest income, and other sources. 16 Of
its three hundred members, one hundred and fifty are financial
contributors.1 7 Consistently with other churches, fifteen of
those donors-that is, the top ten percent of the donors-aver-
age $1,500 per year, while the remaining supporters average
$567 a year."1 8
Each year, the church's revenue covers its budget, with four
percent left to spare. Its total annual expenditures and savings
(which are the same each and every year) are as follows:" 9
Employee compensation $42,004 41%
Professional fees $1,448 1%
Occupancy expenses $16,657 16%
Supplies/Services $6,518 6%
Miscellaneous operating expenses $5,794 6%
Property improvement/Acquisition $13,260 13%
Donations to organizations $10,894 11%
Donations to individuals $1,346 1%
Savings $4,080 4%
$102,000 100%
The church's historical savings amount to $250,000, which is
invested in securities. Its church building is worth $300,000. It
has no other assets with material financial value.
First United Church would like to be involved in the 2008
presidential campaign. It is considering converting from a Tax
Exempt Church to a Taxable Church on January 1, 2007, by
amending its articles of incorporation to explicitly authorize
campaigning. This will cause it to no longer be a Section
501(c) (3) organization. 12 The church would like to determine
the tax and other consequences to this conversion so that it will
know the financial value of its tax exemption and, thereby, the
costs of entering the 2008 campaign.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id.
117. I have arbitrarily elected this number of donors out of a member-
ship of 300.
118. This is based on statistics regarding charitable donors' relative dona-
tions as described in Ellen P. April, Churches, Politics and the Charitable Contribu-
tion Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REv. 843, 845-46, 870-71 (2001).
119. This is a simplified version of congregation operating expenditures
as described in INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 113, at 5-6.
120. See Treas. Reg. 1.501(c) (3)-l (b) (3) (1991).
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1. Confiscatory Costs
First United Church has substantial assets ($550,000 in value
of securities and real estate) that it has accumulated as a Tax
Exempt Church, and it is reasonable to query if all or some sub-
stantial part of the wealth attributable to tax exemption must be
re-paid in the event the church becomes a Taxable Church.
After all, this wealth represents the accumulation of tax-deducti-
ble charitable donations and the systematically re-invested tax-
exempt income generated by the accumulation.
There are two scenarios similar to the conversion of a Tax
Exempt Church into a Taxable Church that result in a potential
confiscation of the wealth accumulated under Section 501 (c) (3):
a change in corporate form and a Section 507 termination. As a
financial matter, the issue is whether or not First United Church
could continue on as Taxable Church involved in politics with
the $550,000 in assets that it accumulated while it was a Tax
Exempt Church prohibited from political involvement.
(a) No Change in Corporate Form
The change to a Taxable Church would not require or cause
a change in state corporate form. Amending the articles of
incorporation to include the explicit power to campaign will
cause First United Church to become a Taxable Church. How-
ever, it will remain a non-profit corporation. The change would
be in federal tax status, and only federal tax status.
A non-profit corporation can re-organize itself into a for-
profit corporation. Such a change would cause First United
Church to become a Taxable Church (since it would no longer
be described in Section 501 (c) (3)), but such a change is not nec-
essary to avoid the campaigning restriction. The campaigning
restriction is derived from Section 501 (c) (3), not state non-profit
corporate law.1 21 It is important to be clear that this is not a
change in state corporate form, since a change in state corporate
form would require a new non-profit corporation to be organ-
ized and First United Church to pay-over its accumulated wealth
to the new non-profit in connection with First United Church
becoming a for-profit corporation.122 This type of "conversion"
121. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (2000).
122. Changes in state corporate form from non-profit to for-profit were
common in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Usually, hospital or other medical
care facilities converted from non-profit corporations into for-profit corpora-
tions. This change in organization at the state statutory level permitted the
ensuing corporation to run the non-profit's business as a for-profit business.
Often, it was important that new capital be raised in order to make the business
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is not required in order for First United Church to commence
campaigning.
(b) No Termination Tax
First United Church's tax exemption would cease when it
amended its articles of incorporation to authorize its campaign-
ing. However, this change in tax status would not be a "termina-
tion" as described in Section 507. A termination under Section
507 triggers a "termination tax" that is the lesser of its "aggregate
tax benefit" or the value of its assets.12 "Aggregate tax benefit" is
defined to mean the sum of all of the tax benefits received by the
entity and all the benefits received by its donors. 2 4 Thus, the
termination tax forces the terminating entity to re-pay all of the
tax benefits it and its donors received over the years or, if it does
not have sufficient assets for the payment, to surrender its cur-
rent assets to the government. The Section 507 termination tax
is, thus, a potentially confiscatory tax.
However, the Section 507 termination tax would not apply
to First United Church's "termination" of its Section 501 (c) (3)
status. The Section 507 termination tax does not apply to
churches. It only applies to "private foundations."125 Although
private foundation status is the presumptive status of Section
501 (c) (3) organizations, churches are specially exempted from
the rules requiring evidence to overcome this status. 1 2 6 This is
one of the special benefits for churches. First United Church
would not be subject to this termination tax because it would not
be considered a private foundation, even if it had a history of
substantial donations from a small number of individuals, which
profitable, and this was the reason for the conversion. However, though this
new capital was a benefit of the conversion, one of the costs was that some part
of the capital raised had to be used as a payment for the loss of the non-profit
corporation's assets. Essentially, the new for-profit corporation was required to
purchase the non-profit's assets, and the sales proceeds for those assets were
then set aside to another charitable corporation for continuing charitable pur-
poses. For a thorough discussion of conversions, see Douglas H. Mancino, Tax-
ation of Conversion Transactions (1996), available at http://www.law.nyu. edu/
ncpl/library/publications/Confl996MancinoPaper.pdf (presented at Nat'l Ctr.
on Philanthropy & the Law Conference on Conversion Transactions: Changing
Between Nonprofit and For-Profit Form).
123. I.R.C. § 507(c) (2000).
124. Id. § 507(d).
125. Id. § 507(a).
126. Id. §§ 508(c)(1)(A), 6033(a) (2) (A) (i).
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typically would make a Section 501 (c) (3) organization into a pri-
vate foundation. 1
27
2. Taxing Campaign Expenses
There are two Tax Code Sections that impose taxes on cam-
paign-related payments by Section 501 (c) (3) organizations: Sec-
tion 4955 and Section 527(f). Note that these taxes are in
addition to the risk of having tax exemption revoked for violating
the campaign prohibition.
(a) Section 4955
Section 4955 taxes "political expenditures" by Section
501(c) (3) organizations.' 28 Section 4955(d) (1) defines "political
expenditure" as any amount paid or incurred in any participa-
tion in or intervention, including the publication or distribution
of statements, in a political campaign on behalf of, or in opposi-
tion to, any candidate for public office. 129 The initial tax is ten
percent of the amount spent.1 30
Typically, organizations are given the opportunity to "cor-
rect" the political expenditure. 131 "Correction" requires recover-
ing the amount expended, to the extent possible, and
establishing safeguards to prevent future campaign expendi-
tures. 132 Of course, First United Church is considering intention-
ally campaigning, so it would not be interested in "recovering"
any amounts spent on political campaigns. Accordingly, the tax
would be increased to one hundred percent of the expendi-
ture. 113 Additionally, First United Church's directors could be
personally penalized up to ten thousand dollars for each expendi-
ture.' Since First United Church's political campaigning would
be intentional, the IRS could decide its political expenditures
were "flagrant," in which event the IRS could seek a court injunc-
tion to keep First United Church from further political
expenditures.' 35
127. Private foundations typically have small donor bases, which is why
they do not qualify as "public charities." See id. §§ 509(a) (1), 170(b) (1) (A).
128. Id. §§ 4955, 6852.
129. Id. § 4955(d)(1).
130. Id. § 4955(a) (1).
131. Id. § 4955(b).
132. Id. § 4955(f)(3).
133. Id. § 4955(b)(1).
134. Id. § 4955(b) (2) (" [1]f an organization manager refused to agree to
all or part of the correction, there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 50 percent
of the amount of the political expenditure.").
135. Id. § 6852.
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Although Section 4955 is an excise tax (i.e., a penalty tax)
structured almost identically to Section 4958 in several important
ways, 136 it does not have a "look back" period. Thus, once an
organization ceases to be a Section 501 (c) (3) organization, Sec-
tion 4955 no longer applies. As a policy matter, the failure to
incorporate a look back period into Section 4955 is questionable
for a penalty tax, since it allows the penalty to be avoided simply
by ceasing to be a Section 501 (c) (3) organization prior to mak-
ing the expenditure. In contrast, the five-year look back period
contained in the structurally similar penalty tax of Section 4958
means an organization continues to be taxed for impermissible
expenditures for five years after it ceases to be a Section
501 (c) (3) organization. Curiously, and importantly, the Section
4955 tax (and the potential personal tax on the church directors
and the potential court injunction) can be avoided by First
United Church making campaign expenditures only after it
becomes a Taxable Church. 3 7
(b) Section 527l)
Section 527(f) also imposes a tax on political expenditures
by Section 501 (c) (3) organizations, but its purpose is unlike that
of Section 4955. Section 4955 is intended to penalize Section
501 (c) (3) organizations that make political expenditures. The
purpose of Section 527(f) is to ensure that all Section 501(a) tax
exempt organizations (which includes Section 501 (c) (3) organi-
zations) are subject to income tax on campaign expenditures in
the same way as tax exempt political organizations.' 38 Its pur-
pose is to enforce equitable taxation between similar organiza-
tions, rather than specifically deterring impermissible
expenditures by Section 501 (c) (3) organizations (which is the
136. Compare id. § 4955 with id. §4958. Section 4958 imposes a penalty tax
on improper expenditures for the benefit of certain individuals (e.g., directors'
self-dealing) in a manner similar to Section 4955's penalty tax on improper
expenditures for political campaigns.
137. This possibility is never considered by the Exemption Essentialists
who analyze Tax Code Section 4955. See, e.g., James, supra note 41, at 45;
McDowell, supra note 7, at 75, 101.
138. See S. RIE. No. 93-1357, at 29-30 (1974), as reprinted in 1975-1 C.B.
517. Section 527(f) accomplishes its purposes by subjecting to income tax (at
the highest specified corporate tax rate) the lesser of the organization's net
investment income or amount spent on campaigning. See I.R.C. § 527(b),
(f) (1) (2000). "Net investment income" is defined primarily as dividends, rents
and royalties. Id. § 527(f)(2). Like most churches, dividends, rents and royal-
ties are not a primary source of revenue for First United Church. Thus, even if
First United Church did make a taxable expenditure, the resulting tax liability
would be minimal.
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purpose of Section 4955). More importantly, like Section 4955,
Section 527(f) does not have a look back period, which means
that so long as First United Church's campaign expenditures fol-
low its change into a Taxable Church it will not be subject to the
tax. 139
3. Income Tax
Section 501 (c) (3) provides First United Church with a
"blanket" exemption from the federal income tax, but the
exemption may not be necessary for the church to avoid an
income tax liability. The Branch Ministries court focused on this
possibility when rejecting The Church at Pierce Creek's claim
that losing its Section 501 (c) (3) status would be a constitution-
ally impermissible burden. The court explained that the revoca-
tion would not "necessarily make the Church liable for the
payment of taxes" because, as "the IRS explicitly represented in
its brief and reiterated at oral argument, the revocation of the
exemption" would not convert donations into income taxable to
the church-such donations are excluded from income under
Section 102.14 The court's point is that Section 102 excludes
gifts from the income of taxable U.S. taxpayers. Since no U.S.
taxpayer who receives a gift (of any value) is subjected to income
tax on the gift, First United Church would not be subject to
income tax on donations it received as a Taxable Church.
Unlike other kinds of Section 501 (c) (3) organizations, most
of a church's revenue is donated.' Other charities' major
sources of revenue tend to be fees, dues, and other charges.
1 4 2
But churches tend to be funded, year in and year out, by dona-
tions. Indeed, churches are almost entirely dependent upon
donations to operate: about eighty-four percent of annual
church revenues are donations.' 4 3 Thus, eighty-four percent of
First United Church's annual revenues are excluded from its
income under Section 102 even though it becomes a Taxable
139. Unlike Section 4955's tax, however, it is not surprising that Section
527(f) has no look back period because its purpose is equity between taxpayers
rather than penalizing improper expenditures.
140. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
141. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 113, at 4; see also April, supra note
118, at 845.
142. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHI-wARz, TAXATION OF NON-PROFIT
ORGANI ATIONS 11 (2003).
143. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 113, at 4; see also April, supra note
118, at 845. Note that an earlier study concluded that ninety-three percent of
church revenue was derived from donations. BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NON-
PROFIT ECONOMY 197 (1988). I have used the more recent and more conserva-
tive conclusion.
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Church. This means that $85,680 of its $102,000 annual revenue
would be tax free, even if First United Church were a Taxable
Church.
As a Taxable Church, First United Church's gross income
would be only $16,320, which is unlikely to generate any income
tax liability for the church. If the church's gross income were sub-
jected to tax, the tax would be only $2,448.144 However, the tax
rate is not applied to gross income. First United Church would
claim a variety of deductions for its operating expenditures: the
$42,004 it pays in compensation; the $1,448 in professional fees;
the $16,657 in occupancy expenses; the $6,518 in supplies; and
the $5,794 in miscellaneous operating expenses. First United
Church also gives $10,984 to other organizations, and if any of
these are Section 501 (c) (3) organizations, First United Church
would be entitled to a charitable deduction (though it would be
limited to ten percent of its taxable income under Section
170(b) (2)). First United Church's potential deductions for its
operating expenses and charitable donations are greater than
$16,320. Like many other taxable American corporations, First
United Church would have no actual tax liability but rather a tax
loss.
There are two ways in which First United Church might not
benefit under Section 102. First, there is a lively debate among
scholars as to the propriety of excluding gifts from income under
Section 102, and there are occasional calls for its elimination
from the Tax Code.145 Secondly, it is possible that the IRS could
reverse the position from the Branch Ministries case and claim
donations to Taxable Churches were not bona fide gifts but some
type of payment for "religious services." '146
However, even assuming either a successful repeal or a suc-
cessful IRS argument against the application of Section 102 to
Taxable Churches, income tax exemption has a surprisingly lim-
ited value for First United Church. First United Church would
144. I.R.C. § 11(b) would require a fifteen percent tax rate to be applied.
I.R.C. § 11 (b) (2000).
145. See, e.g., Alana J. Darnell, Toward An Integrated Tax Treatment of Gifts
and Inheritances, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 671 (2004); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
H. Kahn, Gifts, Gafis and Cefs-The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private
and Charitable 'Gifts' and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts
From Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003); see also Joseph M. Dodge,
Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARv.
L. REv. 1177 (1978).
146. Since the church would be a corporation, Section 118 would be rele-
vant to any change in position by the IRS on the Section 102 issue, especially in
cases of contributions for church facilities. See I.R.C. §§ 102, 118; I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200528022 (June 15, 2005).
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still only have a tax liability if its income (including those dona-
tions) in any year exceeded its deductions. Of the $102,000
annual revenue, $72,421117 would be deductible, leaving only
$29,579 subject to tax. The resulting tax liability would be only
$4,437. If for any reason Section 102 were no longer available to
the church, First United Church would be saved from any signifi-
cant tax liability by the fact that it, like most churches, operates
so near the financial break-even point each year. 148
4. Reduced Revenues from Lost Deductions for Donors?
Even though donations would be excluded from the income
of First United Church once it became a Taxable Church, those
donations would no longer be deductible from the donors'
income. Section 102 excludes the donations from the church's
income, but it is not related to Section 170, which provides an
income tax deduction for the donor to a Section 501 (c) (3)
organization.
The Section 170 deduction would only be lost to a minority
of the church's donors, however. A taxpayer must itemize deduc-
tions in order to claim the charitable deduction. Only about
thirty percent of American taxpayers itemize their deductions
each year,1 49 and there is no reason to believe that First United
Church's donors itemize at a higher rate. Thus, we can assume
that at least seventy percent of First United Church's donors (105
out of 150) do not even claim the charitable deduction.
While there may be reason to suspect that charitable donors
as a group have a higher itemization rate, there is no reason to
suspect that church donors as a group do. Typically, lower-
income taxpayers do not itemize, while higher-income taxpayers
do. However, unlike other kinds of philanthropy that is prima-
rily funded by "big givers," church philanthropy is very broad
based, funded by many "small givers" rather than a few big givers.
For example, in education-centered philanthropy, the top one-
tenth of one percent of donors account for one quarter of the
147. This assumes that donations to other organizations are deductible,
but that the deduction is limited to ten percent of the church's taxable income
under § 170(b)(2). See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2).
148. Operating near the financial break-even point provides planning
opportunities for the church as well, in the event that § 102 is unavailable. By
coordinating the acceptance of donations with the church's actual budgetary
needs during the course of the year, the church could ensure that its revenue
never exceeded its costs.
149. Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Funda-
mental Tax Reform on Nonprofit Organizations, in ECONOMIC EFFECrS OF FUNDAMEN-
TAL TAx REFORM 211, 228 (HenryJ. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996); see also
April, supra note 118, at 845-46, 870-71.
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donations to educational institutions. 50 In other words, a quar-
ter of a school's donations tend to come from one out of one
thousand of its donors. In contrast, for churches, the top ten
percent of donors account for only twenty-five percent of the
donations. 5 1 Since there is no reason to believe church donors
are disproportionately higher-income, there is no reason to
believe that more than thirty percent of First United Church's
donors actually claim a charitable deduction.
Even if thirty percent of First United Church donors claim
the charitable deduction, it seems unlikely they would lessen
their donation level from the current thirty-nine percent in the
event the church becomes a Taxable Church. 5 2 There are three
reasons to doubt that the loss of the income tax deduction would
cause them to donate a lesser amount. First, as an empirical mat-
ter for the general population of charitable donors, it is uncer-
tain if the income tax deduction stimulates significantly more
giving than there would be in its absence. 153 Second, since
church donors do not fit the typical charitable donor profile,
whatever effect the income tax deduction has on donors gener-
ally is unlikely to be the same as it has on church donors specifi-
cally. Third, by becoming a Taxable Church involved in the 2008
campaign, First United Church's donors would be able to re-
150. April, supra note 118, at 845-46, 870-71.
151. Id.
152. Since the top ten percent of church donors account for the top
twenty-five percent of donations to church, $39,510 of First United Church's
$102,000 was given by its top thirty percent of donors, which is about thirty-nine
percent of its donations.
153. The following discussion considers only I.R.C. § 170 income tax
charitable deduction. Since the estate tax is scheduled to die, I.R.C. § 2055
estate tax charitable deduction is unlikely to be relevant. The gift tax survives
even the repeal of the estate tax so the loss of I.R.C. § 2522 gift charitable
deduction might be important. However, each donor could contribute eleven
thousand dollars per year to the church without triggering a liability, since the
church would qualify as a donee under I.R.C. § 2503 annual exclusion. See
I.R.C. § 2503 (2000); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9818042 (Jan. 28, 1998) (contribution
to Section 501 (c) (7) social club qualifies under annual exclusion). Amounts in
excess of the annual exclusion would not trigger a gift tax liability until the
donor's one million dollar lifetime gift tax exemption were used. Garden vari-
ety estate planning techniques, however, could prevent this from being used by
gifts to the church. For example, "loans" to the church forgiven at the donor's
death would not consume any part of the one million dollar exemption. Also,
the common "Crummey trust" could be employed with the church as the bene-
ficiary and some or all of the church members as withdrawal rights holders. See
Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). Thus, while loss of the
gift tax deduction might require some elementary planning on behalf of the
wealthiest of church donors, it is the loss of the income tax charitable deduc-
tion that probably has the most deterrence potential.
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direct their politically-motivated donations to the church, which
could result in a significant increase in donations. This is not
possible as a Taxable Church.
How much of an incentive to give the charitable deduction
provides has been studied in depth for decades, but there is no
consensus as to the extent of the incentive. In the 1970s, there
was a generation of statistical studies implying that charitable giv-
ing was fairly sensitive to the after-tax costs, which were reduced
by the charitable deduction.' 5 4 The expectation was that the sub-
stantial tax-rate cuts in the 1980s would cause charitable giving to
fall appreciably because the charitable deduction would be worth
less to donors.'5 5 However, the predicted drop did not material-
ize.56 While the investigations and debates continue, the cur-
rently ambivalent consensus is that while American taxpayers
"are at least somewhat sensitive" to the effect of the charitable
deduction, there remains "much uncertainty about how much"
sensitivity there is.' 5 7 There is intuitive appeal in believing that
charitable deductions stimulate giving, but empirically, it
remains an open issue.
Even to the extent that the loss of the income tax deduction
might affect charitable donors generally, church philanthropy is
presumably quite different. Though I know of no research into
the effect of the deduction on church donors specifically, it
seems likely that church donors are motivated by deeper relig-
ious and moral objectives than, say, the typical American office
worker who contributes to the United Way office campaign, on
the one hand, or the wealthy business tycoon who buys a business
school for his name, on the other hand. Many church donors
tithe a certain percentage out of religious principle, and no
doubt would be offended by the suggestion that tax savings is a
source of their generosity15 8 The empirical uncertainties as to
the effect of the income tax deduction generally are no doubt
even less clear with respect to church donors specifically.
More important than how many of First United Church's
donors itemize and how the deduction might encourage dona-
tions is the fact that First United Church's members want their
154. JosephJ. Cordes, The Cost of Giving: How Do Changes in Tax Deductions
Affect Charitable Contributions?, in EMERGING ISSUES IN PHILANTHROPY SEMINAR
SERIES 2 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/philan-
thropy_2.pdf.
155. Id.
156. In fact, giving remained entirely stable, except for some changes in
giving by taxpayers in the very highest rate bracket. Id.
157. Id. at 1, 3.
158. Cook, supra note 20, at 471.
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church to be involved politically. First United Church is not a
"normal" church. Best we know, most churches do not want to
engage in as potentially a divisive affair as political campaigns. In
fact, leaders of a broad spectrum of American congregations
have opposed efforts to relax the campaigning restriction in Sec-
tion 501(c) (3).59 The "broad tent" orientation of most main-
stream churches is clearly not First United Church's orientation.
Its members are intellectually and politically monolithic. No
church would seriously investigate the consequences of giving up
its tax exemption to campaign if there was not incredibly strong
support among its members-donors-for it to campaign. It is
reasonable to assume these donors are far more zealous than
average taxpaying philanthropists-for their church and their
politicians-or else their church would not be considering
endorsing their politicians.
Even if the zealous enthusiasm of the their church entering
politics is not sufficient to increase donations to First United
Church by its members (and I suspect it would be), there is an
additional economic dynamic at work. Once First United
Church becomes a Taxable Church, its members can contribute
to it as a way of supporting the favored political candidate. Its
members would not receive a donation for a contribution to the
candidate's campaign anyway. Now, however, by converting to a
Taxable Church, First United Church becomes a potential recipi-
ent of its members' politically-motivated contributions as well as
their religiously-motivated contributions. First United Church's
conversion frees its members to donate to their church those
amounts (over and above their "purely religious" donations) that
they otherwise would be donating to non-deductible political
causes. But so long as First United Church is a Tax Exempt
Church, it will not be receiving politically-motivated contribu-
tions because it cannot be politically active. Once it becomes a
Taxable Church, First United Church can compete for dollars
with its favored candidate's campaign-and presumably has an
advantage with its own members for winning those dollars.
Thus, ignoring how many of the donors itemize deductions
and any theoretical explorations of how much of an incentive
deductions provide, I make two assumptions about First United
Church's donors that I believe must be true for any church that
wants to campaign. I assume their donors are politically and
religiously zealous and that zealousness is embodied in the
church's decision to campaign. I assume that those donors oth-
erwise would be making political contributions outside of their
159. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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church's budget so long as the church cannot campaign, but will
re-direct those contributions to the church once it begins
campaigning. Of course, First United Church could seek bind-
ing pledges prior to becoming taxable, but I doubt that level of
legal protection is required to keep its donation level steady.
From the fact that First United Church members want their
church to campaign, I believe the only reasonable inference is
that those same members want their church to succeed at
campaigning. Any church members offended by the church's
partisan campaigning or likely to reduce their financial support
of the church for tax reasons have, I believe we can assume, left
the church before (or as a result of) the politicization of the
church's identity. Thus, there is good reason to believe that
those donors (who remain) are inclined to increase their level of
support for the church, though obviously we have no objective
data by which to confirm this reasoning.
5. Employee-Related Issues
The IRS might deny that the employees of a Taxable Church
qualify for four specific tax treatments (though not necessarily
"benefits"). First, churches are entitled to operate retirement
plans for their employees that do not comply with the general
retirement plan requirements. Second, there are unique treat-
ments for ministers for Social Security purposes. Third, minis-
ters are exempted from federal unemployment taxes and most
state unemployment taxes. And, finally, ministers are entitled to
certain housing allowances without being subjected to income
tax for them. With the exception of church retirement plans,
the IRS would not have good statutory authority for denying
these treatments to Taxable Churches.
Churches are entitled to establish special retirement plans
that are not subject to the same vesting, funding, and participa-
tion requirements of other retirement plans. These so-called
"church plans" are defined in Section 414(e) with a specific ref-
erence to Section 501, and thus would be unavailable to First
United Church. However, it seems rather unlikely that, with only
$42,004 a year in annual compensation expenses, any church
would have established a special retirement plan.1 60 The use and
160. For purposes of this article, I have assumed that churches (including
First United Church) are independent and self-governed. However, those
belonging to denominations and hierarchies may have retirement plans for
church employees established at the denominational or hierarchical levels. For
a discussion of church plans, see G. Daniel Miller & David W. Powell, Retirement,
Deferred Compensation and Welfare Plans of Tax-exempt and Government Employers:
New Developments for Church Plans Including the Impact of the Economic Growth and
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benefits of these retirement plans by churches appears to remain
unstudied in the legal scholarship, so it is unclear the extent and
value of these special provisions. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that a potential "cost" of becoming a Taxable Church
might be that the church employees would need to establish indi-
vidual retirement accounts or the church needs to establish an
alternative retirement plan.
For Social Security purposes,' 6 ' ministers of churches are
generally treated as self-employed.' 62 This special treatment is
provided by Section 3121(w) (3), which, as mentioned, has no
reference to Section 501 (c) (3) (or campaigning). However, the
IRS Form 8274 used in connection with this Code Section
defines a church as a type of Section 501 (c) (3) organization.
Thus, the IRS position clearly is that only ministers of Tax
Exempt Churches are self-employed. This not a position with
statutory support, nor is it a position with an obvious policy basis
either. However, it is a position that indicates a litigation risk
with the IRS.
Usually one-half of the Social Security tax is paid by the
employer and the other half by the employee. However, self-
employed persons pay "both halves." Services provided by minis-
ters are generally treated as self-employment. This 'aves the
church the Social Security tax it would otherwise pay with respect
to the minister's compensation, though, as a practical matter,
this tax savings might be passed along to the minister in the form
of higher compensation since otherwise, his share of the tax is
doubled without any offsetting benefit to him. Thus, it is hard to
quantify what, if any, financial savings a church has as a result of
the minister being treated as self-employed. Accordingly, even if
the issue were litigated with the IRS and the IRS prevailed
despite the lack of statutory support, it is not clear the church
would have any additional cost.
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COURSE OF STUDY (Dec. 6-8, 2001).
161. For those who conscientiously object to the Social Security tax sys-
tem, special provisions for exemptions are made. Since these exemptions are
provided in a religious context, the meaning of "church" and whether or not it
would include a Taxable Church could be important. See I.R.C.
§§ 3121 (b) (8) (B), 3121 (w) (2), 3127, 1402(e) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(e)-
2A, 5A (1974 and as amended in 1988).
162. See I.R.C. § 3121; see generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 517, SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER INFORMATION FOR MEM-
BERS OF THE CLERGY AND RELIGIOUS WORKERS (2004); INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, PUB. No. 15-A, EMPLOYER'S SUPPLEMENTAL TAx
GUIDE (2001).
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Under Section 3309, church ministers are exempted from
the federal unemployment tax. 163 Like Section 3121(w) (3), Sec-
tion 3309(b) (1) (A) defines "church" without reference to Sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) (or campaigning), but the IRS clearly takes the
position that a "church" for these purposes must be a Section
501 (c) (3) organization. 164
Currently, First United Church is certainly exempted from
paying the unemployment insurance tax. If the IRS takes the
position that First United Church as a Taxable Church is not
entitled to this exemption, the IRS may assess an unemployment
tax liability for the church based on the minister's compensation.
Again, like the Social Security tax issue, this is an issue that the
IRS might litigate but not an IRS position for which there is statu-
tory support.
One tax benefit that accrues to the minister's direct finan-
cial benefit rather than the church's is the Tax Code Section 107
exclusion from the minister's gross income (for income tax pur-
poses, not self-employment tax purposes) of his or her housing
allowance (e.g., parsonage or rental allowance) under certain
conditions. While the specific conditions of this benefit are not
our concern, we do need to note the potentially negative impact
on the minister's personal tax liability if he is assessed a tax on
the housing allowance as a result of the IRS taking the position
that a Taxable Church does not count as a "church" for Section
107 purposes. Substantively, like Section 3121 (w) (3) and Section
3309(b) (1) (A), Section 107 contains no reference to Section
501(c)(3) (or campaigning). However, again, like the Social
Security and unemployment insurance tax issues, the IRS could
follow the pattern and assert without statutory support that Sec-
tion 107 only applies to ministers of Tax Exempt Churches.
Unlike the definition related to church plans in Section
414(e), the definition of "church" in the other employee-related
sections contains no reference to Section 501 (c) (3). The Tax
Code provides no definition of "church," nor do the Treasury
Regulations, nor have the courts. As a practical matter, the IRS
reads into these sections a requirement of Section 501 (c) (3) tax
exemption as a matter of course, since this exemption is part of
the IRS-devised definition of "church."
Without a statutory definition of church, the IRS has devel-
oped a multi-prong test for a "church" for general federal tax
purposes that requires the organization to be a Section 501 (c) (3)
163. I.R.C. § 3309(b).
164. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUB.
No. 557, TAx-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (2005).
20061
164 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
organization. The origins of the multi-prong test are in the need
of the IRS to divide sham churches from bonafide churches. It is
unclear if the position that a church must be a Section 501 (c) (3)
organization is a substantive position or only a strategic one.
Strategically, it is preferable to avoid constitutional arguments
about religious beliefs by denying an organization "church" sta-
tus because it violates Section 501 (c) (3) by, for example, distrib-
uting its profits to its minister. However, substantively, since the
word "church" is not used in Section 501 but is used, for exam-
ple, in Section 3121, Section 3309, and the Treasury Regulations
for Section 107, it is suspicious to argue that the requirements in
Section 501 (c) (3) that apply to zoos and universities as well as
churches should be construed to define "church" for purposes of
those other sections. Historically, it seems likely that there have
been relatively few bona fide churches that did not claim Section
501 (c) (3) status, so there has been little need for the IRS to clar-
ify its positions on how the term "church" is used in the different
Tax Code Sections. Since none of those other sections mention
political campaigning, the IRS would be on uncertain ground to
transport the political campaign prohibition to Sections 3121,
3309, and 107, for example. But, out of institutionalized habit, if
nothing else, it might.
6. Miscellaneous Federal Benefits
The catalog of potential federal benefits to First United
Church is seemingly endless,' 65 but its length should not cause us
to assume its importance. For example, it is quite unlikely that
First United Church is interested in issuing tax-exempt bonds'66
or that it has any material benefit from its exemption to the fed-
eral wagering excise tax. 167 The exemptions and benefits under
federal and antitrust laws or securities regulations are of no par-
ticular value to First United Church either, 168 nor are the special
benefits immigrant religious workers may be entitled to
receive.169 And, while it may enjoy certain postal privileges, it is
important to realize that Section 501(c) (3) status is not a prereq-
uisite for special postal rates for churches-the only prerequisite
165. See Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed ly Nonprofit
Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 85 (1993).
166. See I.R.C. § 145(a) (1) (2000); Facchina, supra note 165, at 98-99.
167. See I.R.C. § 4421 (2) (b); Facchina, supra note 165, at 103.
168. See Facchina, supra note 165, at 104-11.
169. For discussion of the potential visa issue, see StuartJ. Lark & Erich
T. Kennedy, Status Under the Code Affects More Than Just Tax exemption, 15 TAX'N
OF EXEMPTS 220 (2004).
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is that the church is operated as a non-profit.1 70 The postal bene-
fit underscores the importance of determining if a particular
"miscellaneous" benefit a church is receiving is technically due to
its tax exemption or merely its non-profit corporate status. The
postal benefit is the only one of concern to First United Church
(and most churches, I presume), and it will not be affected by
the church becoming a Taxable Church.
7. State Tax Issues
Having run the church through the gauntlet of federal
issues for First United Church, it is important to consider the
potential state issues that might arise if First United Church is no
longer described in Section 501 (c) (3) as a result of campaigning.
Even though First United Church is located in Texas, the follow-
ing gives an idea of the range of issues that might arise in any
state.
(a) Income and Franchise Tax
Texas does not impose a state income tax per se, but it does
impose a franchise tax on corporations. However, as a state non-
profit corporation with an "established congregation" that is
"regularly attending" the "religious worship services," First
United Church is exempt from the state franchise tax, even if it is
not exempt under Section 501(c)(3).1 7 1 Exemption from the
Texas franchise tax does not require exemption from the federal
income tax.
Texas is not unique in defining its state income/franchise
tax exemption without reference to Section 501 (c) (3) or avoid-
ing campaigning. For example, the Delaware exemption
requires neither federal exemption nor avoiding campaign-
ing. 17 However, some states, such as Michigan, 1 7' do directly or
indirectly incorporate Section 501 (c) (3) into their state income
tax exemption. California expressly precludes exemption for
non-profits that campaign. 174
However, a state-by-state review of income and franchise tax
exemption would be a red herring. Even those states that would
not exempt a Taxable Church typically follow the federal scheme
170. U.S. POSTAL SERV. DOMESTIC MAIL MANuAL § 700.1.1 (2005); see also
Facchina, supra note 165, at 112.
171. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.058 (Vernon 2002); 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.541(c) (3) (2002).
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b) (2) (1997).
173. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 208.35(1)(c), 208.35(5) (2003).
174. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701(d) (West 2004).
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in defining "income" and deductions. To the extent the federal
scheme is followed, there would be no state tax so long as the
sum of annual donations and annual operating expenses
exceeded annual revenue.
(b) Property Taxes
The State of Texas does not incorporate into its property tax
exemptions a requirement that the church be exempt under Sec-
tion 501(c) (3), nor does it include an independent prohibition
against campaigning. 7 5 Thus, under Texas law, First United
Church's $300,000 church building would remain exempt from
property tax.
Like Texas, Arizona exempts property used by churches for
religious worship without requiring the church to be exempt
under Section 501(c) (3).176 And similar laws are found in other
states, such as Indiana, 177 Iowa, 178 and Kansas. 17' These laws typi-
cally exempt only the real property being used for religious ser-
vices. It is the use to which the property is put rather than the
fact that a church owns it that is essential for the exemption.
More importantly, none of these statutes requires Section
501 (c) (3) exemption or expressly conditions exemption on
political abstinence.
(c) Sales Taxes
State laws may exempt church purchases from sales tax or
church sales from sales tax, generally so long as the purchases or
sales are related to the church's religious programs. In Texas,
there is no requirement that "an organization created for relig-
ious purposes" be exempt under Section 501 (c) (3) in order to
have its purchases be exempt (but there is a specific exemption
for purchases by an organization described in Section
501 (c) (3)).18o Regardless of whether or not First United Church
is a Tax Exempt Church, Texas will allow it a sales tax exemption
for fund-raising sales, but only so long as no more than $5,000 is
raised. 181
Some state sales tax exemptions are idiosyncratic and must
be reviewed carefully. For example, Virginia's sales tax exemp-
175. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (Vernon 2002).
176. ARiz. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 42-11109 (1999).
177. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-21 (2000).
178. IOWA CODE § 427.1 (1998).
179. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-210 (1997).
180. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.310 (Vernon 2002).
181. Id.
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tion only applies if the purchases are used in worship services by
a congregation in a single location.'82 Alabama statutes list
exempt entities by name.183 The District of Columbia requires a
certificate from the mayor. 8 4 None of these odd rules, however,
prohibits campaigning by the church or require Section
501 (c) (3) exemption.
Several states do specifically require that the church be a
Section 501(c) (3) organization: Colorado, Connecticut, Ken-
tucky, New Mexico, and Vermont, for example.8 5 Were First
United Church located in a state that required Section 501 (c) (3)
tax exemption to confer exemptions from sales tax, it would lose
this benefit. The annual cost of this loss would depend upon the
sales tax rate and the value of the church's annual purchases that
would otherwise have qualified. This would have to be chalked
up to the cost of campaigning.
8. Toggling Tax Status
The court in the Branch Ministries case looked at the tax
exemption issue on a year-by-year basis and pointed out that the
church always had the option to simply reclaim its exemption by
giving up campaigning. 8 6 Thus, could First United Church con-
vert from a Taxable Church back to a Tax Exempt Church in
2008 when the campaign is concluded?
Converting from a Taxable Church back into a Tax Exempt
Church probably would subject the church to tax to the extent it
had built-in gains. The IRS would (and probably should) charac-
terize such a conversion as a deemed liquidation of a taxable cor-
poration followed by a contribution of those assets to the new
tax-exempt corporation. This is similar to how the IRS character-
izes the conversion of a corporation to a partnership. 87
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-609.10 (repealed 2004); see also Jennifer C.
Root & Norman H. Wright, Classifying State Sales Tax exemptions for Religious Orga-
nizations, I IJ. TAX'N EXEMPTS 279, 280 (2000).
183. ALA. CODE § 40-9-1 (2005); see also Root & Wright, supra note 182, at
281.
184. D.C. CODE § 47-2005(3) (2005); see also Root & Wright, supra note
182, at 281.
185. COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-26-114 (repealed 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 12412(8) (2005); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 139.495 (West 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-60 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9743(3) (2001); see also Root
& Wright, supra note 182, at 281.
186. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
187. Treas. Reg. 301.7701-3(g)(1)(ii) (1999); Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1
C.B. 71; see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9618803 (May 3, 1996); Treas. Reg.
301.7701-3(g)(1)(iii) (1999); Rev. Rul. 2003-125, 2003-52 I.R.B. 1243.
2006]
168 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
The incentive for "toggling" is obvious: collect deductible
contributions in non-campaigning years as a Tax Exempt Church
but then become a Taxable Church in campaigning years and
spend the previously deducted contributions. However, the
deemed liquidation argument could be disastrous, since church
assets would have carry-over bases for gifted assets and presump-
tively low-cost bases for assets held for long periods (such as their
buildings). There would be arguments to be made by the church
that these bases should be adjusted to fair market value when the
church toggled from Taxable to Tax Exempt, and thus, when
going the other way, a church could find itself with a substantial
tax liability. 18
8
9. Transitional Costs and Complications
Just like First United Church, Tax Exempt Churches
pondering the transition to Taxable Church status must begin
with their particular situation. For example, those beginning as
unincorporated associations-rather than incorporated non-
profits-or those subject to denominational structural control
would have a more complicated analysis than the congregation-
ally-governed non-profit corporation churches like First United
Church. The law of unincorporated associations and who legally
controls what in denominational structures are obviously a set of
considerations independent of the tax law.189 Furthermore,
thinking beyond the symbolism of Section 501 (c) (3) might be
more difficult for some congregations than others, since symboli-
cally it may be taken to represent some level of legitimacy. Pro-
fessional fees involved in conducting this sort of analysis and in
the annual reporting requirements of taxable corporations
would also be a cost to be measured, of course. More impor-
tantly, and the essence of the issue, is how a congregation
resolves the religious issue: is it permissible, prohibited, or neces-
sary for a church to campaign? For those concluding they must
campaign, the steps from conclusion to campaigning will vary,
but each of them must work through the tax issues presented
above.
188. Perhaps this result could be avoided by organizing the church as a
trust rather than a corporation, since the corporate liquidation rules would not
be relevant when the church toggled between Section 501 (c) (3) status and tax-
able trust status.
189. See, e.g., Elizabeth Austin, Exodus, Numbers, Judges, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
June 2004, at 65; Neela Banjeree, American Ruptures Shaking the Episcopal Church,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at A29; Greg Mellen, Ruling Goes Well for Breakaway
Parish, LONG BEACH PRESS TELEGRAM, Sept. 17, 2005, at A4; Gary Stern, Church
Seeks to End its Presbyterian Ties, J. NEWS, Sept. 18, 2004, at IA.
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10. Conclusion
The assumption that the tax issues effectively prohibit First
United Church from converting into a Taxable Church is wrong.
Federal tax exemption for First United Church turns out not to
be worth much. Had First United Church been located in cer-
tain states, it would have incurred the potential cost of losing its
state sales tax exemption. Nevertheless, the costs of the conver-
sion into a Taxable Church in order to campaign for President in
2008 are insignificant for First United Church. 9 '
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TAXABLE CHURCHES
If federal income tax exemption under Section 501 (c) (3)
turns out not to be as valuable for churches as is popularly
assumed, the implications are significant. There are implications
for churches that want to campaign. There are implications for
the IRS, which might see an increase in the number of churches
voluntarily surrendering their Section 501 (c) (3) status. There
are implications for Congress, especially since prior attempts to
permit campaigning by churches have failed. There are implica-
tions for the scholarly agenda, which has by and large been built
upon a faulty premise. And, of course, there are implications for
those involved in politics.
A. Implications for Churches
Churches ought not make guesses about the value of their
assets or their moral convictions. There is no reason to believe
that most American churches are eager to claim an express polit-
ical identity, though there are indications that, more and more,
religious and political identities in America are being fused.'9 1
For churches with a clear moral conviction to campaign, the
implication of the Asset Management Analysis is clear: crunch
the numbers. Determine the cost of losing tax exemption.
Decide if that cost is worth campaigning. Do not be distracted by
imaginations as to what tax exemption is about. It is about taxes.
190. This conclusion, however, should not provide comfort to a church
that has its exemption involuntarily revoked for prior campaigning since such a
church might be subject to the excise tax under Section 4955, for example. See
I.R.C. § 4955 (2000).
191. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Political Split Leaves a Church Sadder and Grayer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at Al (church members told to vote Republican or to
leave church). But see Elisabeth Bumiller, Preaching to the Choir? Not This Time,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A15 (evangelical left opposition to Bush); David F.
Kirkpatrick, Democrats Turn to Leader of Religious Left, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at
A15 (indicating increasing influence of Jim Wallis as leader of left-wing
evangelicals).
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It is about money. It is not about the "right" and "wrong" way to
be a church, which is a religious issue and not a tax issue. It
should be-and presumably is-the religious convictions and
not the tax worries of churches that keep them out of politics.
B. Implications for the Tax Policy
Prior Congressional proposals to permit churches to cam-
paign failed, but none considered the Taxable Church as a viable
option.'92 Taxable Churches do not divert deductible donations
to non-deductible political purposes because their donors do not
receive deductions. There is no reason to deny their ministers
housing allowances or any of the other tax treatments of a bona
fide church that do not directly relate to income tax exemption
or the charitable deduction. Congress ought to ensure that Tax-
able Churches are regarded as statutorily legitimate alternatives
to Tax Exempt Churches.
The Treasury Department should consider whether new reg-
ulations ought to be proposed to address Taxable Churches. In
addition to clarifying the treatment of the housing allowances of
the ministers employed by Taxable Churches and the tax conse-
quences for re-organizing a Taxable Church as a Tax Exempt
Church, for example, the Treasury Department might consider a
check-the-box styled regulation that would allow churches to
choose their tax treatment on a simple form and then devise a
series of appropriate reporting mechanisms for each kind of
church. 19
3
In the absence of express direction from Congress or new
Treasury Regulations, the IRS needs to consider what position it
should take in the event that Taxable Churches become more
common. The sham church audit positions were not devised and
are not suitable for the issues raised by bona fide churches that
simply are not interested in either the benefits or the restrictions
of Section 501 (c) (3). Agents should not have the mindset that a
church outside the Section 501(c) (3) box is somehow less of a
church. Instead, the IRS audit position as to the relationship
between the term "church" in Sections 3121, 3309, and 107
192. For a review of recent proposals, see supra note 43.
193. For many years, federal tax policy closely guarded taxation as a part-
nership. It was technically complex for a business to earn the pass-through
partnership taxation treatment rather than the corporate tax treatment, and
tax lawyers made good money giving written opinions when one did. Then, in
1997, it all changed. Partnership status became elective. Simply a matter of
"check the box." For an overview of the practical implications of this regime,
see William P. Streng, Choice of Entity, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 700-2d, at
I.C. (1999).
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(from the Treasury Regulations) should be explored and clari-
fied. It should not be assumed that the requirements in Section
501(c) (3) that apply to the entire range of charities-from the
Red Cross to the Ford Foundation-must be part of the defini-
tion of "church" for all federal tax purposes, especially since the
word "church" is not used in Section 501 (c) (3).
C. Implications for Scholars
Exemption Essentialism is a symbolic interpretation of the
Tax Code. It reflects the preference for big solutions in legal
scholarship. To make room for the big solutions in this context,
the problem has been made big enough to fit the solution. The
problem is a tax problem. However, it is re-interpreted as a con-
stitutional, historical, or religious problem, but not because such
re-interpretation is necessary to solve the problem. 194 Rather, I
believe, it is done because such re-interpretation is necessary to
write an article about the Constitution, history, and religion. 195
The exaggeration of this technical tax problem into these epic
realms requires a decision not to explore the potential for taxa-
tion posed by the Tax Code. This is an odd and, I believe, meth-
odologically indefensible decision.
I do not believe it is settled that tax exemption for churches
is worth little. It may very well be that First United Church is an
exceptional case. Or it may be that, in the "real world,"
churches' exemptions from antitrust laws are crucial to their
financial health. The implication of this Article is that the schol-
arly agenda would do well to turn to calculating the costs and
benefits of tax exemptions for churches. The Tax Code should
be interpreted economically, not symbolically, and there could
be a good deal of work done towards an economic interpretation
for churches.
D. Implications for Political Opponents
The implications of Taxable Churches participating in
campaigning are important for American partisans, who have
politicized the issue.'96 This political tension is motivating a
194. For a discussion on impractical legal scholarship that uses theoreti-
cal analyses not only for the "hard" issues but the "easy" ones, see Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 44 (1992).
195. See Farber, supra note 9; Zlotnick, supra note 9.
196. See, e.g., Robert Novak, Civil War Looms for Republicans, CHI. SUN
TIMES, June 28, 2004, at 39; Marni Pyke, Churches Tread Carefully in Election Pro-
cess, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 31, 2004, at 1; Shaunti Feldhahn & Diane Glass,
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good deal of tax tattling to the IRS now, which has its hands full
of churches to audit on the campaign issue-and little to no
prospect of such audits generating much revenue, I believe.197
Partisans should not assume that the health, wealth, and
influence of churches is to be found in their tax exemption, even
though the Exemption Essentialist scholarship has been built on
the assumption. Having the tax exemption of "enemy churches"
revoked is not going to destroy their health, wealth, or influence.
It might be a paperwork headache for a few months, but the
likely result is energizing the church's faithful. Providing the
"enemy churches" with a martyr's glow is probably not a good
political strategy, especially if the would-be martyr can keep the
glow and stay alive.
My suggestion to partisans is to appeal to churches all you
want. Encourage their pulpit endorsements, but encourage
them to drop their Tax Exempt status first. Some basic respect
for the law is not too much to expect from people wanting to run
the world. And stop the tattling. Agreeing not to snitch to the
tax man should not be too much to expect either, even when it is
snitching on someone in the "other" party. The prospect of a
nation of snitchers hoping to cause problems with the govern-
ment for those whose religion or politics offends them should be
equally horrifying to Republicans as to Democrats. No one likes
a tattle tale: "Tell tale tit, Your tongue shall be slit, And all the
dogs in town, Shall have a little bit."' 98
CONCLUSION: CAMPAIGNING AND TAXABLE CHURCHES
Working through the hypothetical proved that federal tax
exemption for First United Church turns out not to be worth
much. The income tax exemption per se was not worth much to
the church, since the church would not have had an income tax
liability in any event, since donations are not "income," and since
the church's deductible operating expenses more than cover its
revenues that are not donations. The taxes for political-related
expenses do not apply, so long as the church becomes a Taxable
Church prior to making the expenditures. It is also clear that the
church will not have to "re-pay" or otherwise lose any of the assets
it accumulated while a Tax Exempt Church even if it becomes a
Speeches that Violate IRS Tax-Exempt Rules, ajc.com, Sept. 24, 2004, http://
www.AJC.com/blogs/content/shared-blogs/ajc/woman/en tries/ 2004/09/24/
shouldchurchs.html see also Rat Out a Church, supra note 46.
197. See supra note 44.
198. For the variations of "tattle tale, tattle tale," see IONA OPIE & PETER
OPIE, THE LORE AND LANGUAGE OF SCHOOLCHILDREN 189-91 (1959).
CAMPAIGNING FROM THE PULPIT IS OKAY
Taxable Church involved in politics. Even though the thirty per-
cent of the church's donors who deduct their contributions will
no longer be able to do so, the fact that these politically zealous
church-goers will now be able to contribute their politically-moti-
vated (as well as their religiously-motivated) donations to First
United Church gives us good reason to believe the level of dona-
tions to the church will increase rather than decrease.
Nevertheless, the conclusion is not that relatively minor tax
issues are the only barriers keeping churches from campaigning.
The conclusion is that a certain methodology must be used to
determine what the barriers are. The Exemption Essentialists'
assumption that the costs of losing tax exemption are always so
high that churches have an insurmountable barrier to campaign-
ing is unsupported-and insupportable. The barriers should not
be assumed to be high. Nor should they be assumed to be low.
They should be calculated one-by-one, case-by-case. It is only by
working through the Tax Code sections with a calculator in one
hand and a church's actual budget in another that the financial
value of tax exemption can be determined. However, since First
United Church fits the financial profile of medium-sized congre-
gations across America, we do have reason to believe that the
D.C. Court of Appeals got it right in Branch Ministries when it said
that revoking a church's tax exemption is more symbolic than
substantial.
If federal income tax exemption turns out not to be espe-
cially valuable for churches more generally, Tax Exempt
Churches can convert to Taxable Churches and begin campaign-
ing. The government will need to address both technical and
broad policy issues if there is a significant movement by bonafide
churches outside the Section 501 (c) (3) box. Legal scholars
should turn their attention toward calculating the tax implica-
tions for churches and the implications for tax policy more gen-
erally. And finally, partisans should stop tattling to the IRS on
the churches of their political opponents, since an IRS entangle-
ment with the churches is only likely to increase their partisan
zeal and very unlikely to impact their bottom line-except per-
haps to increase it with the inflow of politically-motivated dollars
once the church becomes taxable and free of the Section
501(c) (3) campaign restrictions.
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